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NOTES
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS' LIFETIME
AND TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS:
SAFEGUARDING DECEDENTS' ESTATES
INTRODUCTION
Anglo-American jurisprudence has long recognized the importance
of ensuring that the intent of a decedent to devise or bequeath prop-
erty be the result of careful deliberation ' and that his intention not be
thwarted by spurious claims against his estate.2 This goal has been
achieved by the universal requirement that distribution of an estate be
either in accordance with a writing validly executed under the Statute
of Wills,3 or pursuant to the laws of intestate succession. 4
Most jurisdictions, however, have failed to provide the safeguard of
a writing requirement in those situations in which a testamentary
transfer of money or property is to be accomplished by a contract to
make a will, or by a contract not performable within a lifetime. In
both cases, the obligation assumed requires performance after the
1. See First Gulf Beach Bank & Trust Co. v. Grubaugh, 330 So. 2d 205, 210
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 299, 113
N.E.2d 424, 428 (1953); In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 654, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468,
475 (Sur. Ct. 1941); Sherman v. Johnson, 159 Ohio St. 200, 222, 112 N.E.2d 326,
333 (1953); Spinks v. Rice, 187 Va. 730, 742-43, 47 S.E.2d 424, 430 (1948); Frieders
v. Estate of Frieders, 180 Wis. 430, 433-34, 193 N.W. 77, 78-79 (1923); T. Atkinson,
Handbook of the Law of Wills §§ 3-4, at 11-30 (2d ed. 1953); A. Scott, Abridgment
of the Law of Trusts § 53, at 115 (1960); B. Sparks, Contracts to Make a Will 48
(1956); G. Thompson, The Law of Wills § 101, at 157-58 (3d ed. 1948); ef. Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 799, 803-04 (1941) (writing will induces
deliberateness).
2. Sherman v. Johnson, 159 Ohio St. 209, 222, 112 N.E.2d 326, 333 (1953);
Spinks v. Rice, 187 Va. 730, 742-43, 47 S.E.2d 424, 430 (1948); Frieders v. Estate of
Frieders, 180 Wis. 430, 433-34, 193 N.W. 77, 78-79 (1923); see T. Atkinson, supra
note 1, at § 62, 292-93; G. Bogert, Handbook of the Law of Trusts § 22, at 55 (5th
ed. 1973); 1 W. Bowe & D. Parker, Page on the Law of Wills § 10.10, at 463-64
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Page]; 2 Page, supra, § 19.4, at 66; A. Scott, supra note 1,
§ 55.9, at 133; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 48; G. Thompson, supra note 1, § 101, at
157-58, § 114, at 182.
3. See First Gulf Beach Bank & Trust Co. v. Grubaugh, 330 So. 2d 205, 210
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Sherman v. Johnson, 159 Ohio St. 209, 222, 112 N.E.2d
326, 333 (1953); Frieders v. Estate of Frieders, 180 Wis. 430, 433-34, 193 N.W. 77,
78-79 (1923); T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 62, at 292-94, § 63, at 296; G. Bogert,
supra note 2, § 22, at 55; 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.10, at 463; A. Scott, supra note 1,
§ 40, at 95-96; G. Thompson, supra note 1, § 28, at 58, § 114, at 182.
4. T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 38, at 159; 2 Page, supra note 2, § 19.4, at
68-69; G. Thompson, supra note 1, § 2, at 1-2.
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death of the promisor, often in derogation of a will. 5 In fact, most
jurisdictions will enforce such contracts,6 even those proven by parol
evidence, 7 although they circumvent the policy behind the Statute of
Wills" and pose a great potential for fraud and perjury.0 Eleven
states have sought to close this loophole in the Statute of Wills by
enacting specific Statute of Frauds' provisions that require these con-
tracts to be evidenced by a writing. 0 This Note contends that the
writing requirement imposed by such legislation is both necessary and
beneficial. It is recommended that the legislatures in those jurisdic-
5. See First Gulf Beach Bank & Trust Co. v. Grubaugh, 330 So. 2d 205, 210
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 299, 113
N.E.2d 424, 428 (1953); Sherman v. Johnson, 159 Ohio St. 209, 214-15, 112 N.E.2d
326, 330 (1953); Spinks v. Rice, 187 Va. 730, 742-43, 47 S.E.2d 424, 430 (1948); T.
Atkinson, supra note 1, § 48, at 217; 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.11, at 467; G.
Thompson, supra note 1, § 16, at 35.
6. Pitt v. United States, 319 F.2d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 1963) (applying Missouri
law); McCargo v. Steele, 160 F. Supp. 7, 15 (W.D. Ark.) (applying Arkansas law),
aff'd, 260 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1958); Rodgers v. Street, 215 Ga. 643, 644-45, 112
S.E.2d 598, 599-600 (1960); In re Estate of Guest, 35 I11. App. 2d 434, 439-40, 183
N.E.2d 194, 196 (1962); Drewen v. Bank of the Manhattan Co., 31 N.J. 110, 116-17,
155 A.2d 529, 532 (1959); In re Liggins Estate, 393 Pa. 500, 503, 143 A.2d 349, 351
(1958); T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 48, at 210-11; 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.1, at
432-34, § 10.10, at 463-64; G. Thompson, supra note 1, § 16, at 32-33.
7. Pitt v. United States, 319 F.2d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 1963) (applying Missouri
law); Rodgers v. Street, 215 Ga. 643, 644-45, 112 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1960); Brewer v.
Mackey, 177 Ga. 813. 814, 171 S.E. 273, 273-74 (1933); Lawrence v. Oglesby, 178
I11. 122, 128-29, 52 N.E. 945, 946 (1899); Gerard v. Steinbock, 169 Neb. 828, 830-32,
101 N.W.2d 194, 197 (1960); Doby v. Williams, 53 N.J. Super. 548, 552-53, 148
A.2d 42, 45 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1959); In re Liggins Estate, 393 Pa. 500, 503-04,
143 A.2d 349, 351 (1958); T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 48, at 213; 1 Page, supra note
2, § 10.1, at 432-34, § 10.11, at 464-65; G. Thompson, supra note 1, § 16, at 34.
8. See First Gulf Beach Bank & Trust Co. v. Grubaugh, 330 So. 2d 205, 210
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 654, 31 N.Y.S.2d
468, 475 (Sur. Ct. 19,11); Sherman v. Johnson, 159 Ohio St. 209, 222, 112 N.E.2d
326, 333 (1953); Spinks v. Rice, 187 Va. 730, 742-43, 47 S.E.2d 424, 430 (1948); G.
Thompson, supra note 1, § 16, at 36; 3 Brooklyn L. Rev. 150, 154 (1933).
9. 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.10, at 463-64; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 26; see
Ray, Dead Man's Statutes, 24 Ohio St. L. J. 89, 90 (1963); Editorial Note, Effect of
the New Ohio Statute of Frauds on a Prior Oral Contract to lake a Will, 16 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 166, 166-67 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Ohio Statute of Frauds]; 7 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 132, 133 (1960).
10. Five states have both a lifetime and testamentary provision within their
Statute of Frauds. Alaska Stat. § 09.25.010(a)(2) (1973); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann, §
44-101(8) (1967); Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(6) (West 1973); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 656-1(7)
(1976 & Supp. 1980); N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(a)(1) (McKinney 1978) (lifetime
provision); N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law § 13-2.1(a)(2) (McKinney 1967) (testa-
mentary provision). Six states have only a testamentary provision. Ala. Code §
8-9-2(6) (1975); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 2715 (1975)- Fla. Stat. Ann. § 732.701(1)
(West 1976); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, § 51(7) (1978); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 259,
§§ 5, 5A (Michie/Law. Co-op 1980); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2107.04 (Page 1976).
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tions lacking a writing requirement ponder the important safeguards
afforded an estate by such a statutory mandate, and consider enacting
amendments to their Statutes of Frauds to regulate lifetime and testa-
mentary contracts.
This Note also explores the exceptions to the requirements of the
Statute of Frauds that have been developed by the judiciary over the
years. Although designed to alleviate some of the hardships occasioned
by rigid adherence to the Statute," these exceptions threaten to drasti-
cally reduce the effectiveness of the Statute's lifetime and testamen-
tary provisions. This Note strongly suggests that courts carefully scru-
tinize any exception to the Statute of Frauds' writing requirement in
light of the important policy considerations embodied in the lifetime
and testamentary provisions.
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Contracts to make a testamentary disposition and contracts not
performable within a lifetime have historically been viewed with
suspicion. 12  In these types of contracts, the promisor's obligation
usually entails performance after his death, long after the making of
the contract with the promisee.' 3 Claims arising out of the breach of
11. A. Scott, supra note 1, § 40.1, at 97-98, § 55.9, at 133-34: Note, Promissonj
Estoppel as a Means of Defeating the Statute of Frauds, 44 Fordham L. Rev. 114,
115-16 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Promissonj Estoppel]; Note, Statute of Frauds-
The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the Statute of Frauds, 66 Mich. L. Rev. 170,
170 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Equitable Estoppel].
12. Hamlin v. Stevens, 177 N.Y. 39, 47-48, 69 N.E. 118, 120-21 (1903); In re
Tschirky, 206 Misc. 868, 870-71, 135 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555-56 (Sur. Ct. 1954); In re
Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 649-50, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 471 (Sur. Ct. 1941); 1
Page, supra note 2, § 10.1, at 435, § 10.43, at 526-27; A. Corbin, Corbin on
Contracts § 432, at 441 (abr. ed. 1952); see Gerard v. Steinbock 169 Neb. 828,
830-32, 101 N.W.2d 194, 197 (1960); Doby v. Williams, 53 N.J. Super. 548, 553-54,
148 A.2d 42, 45 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1959); B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 24-26
(1956); Ohio Statue of Frauds, supra note 9, at 167; 19 St. John's L. Rev. 152, 152-53
(1945).
13. Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 298, 113 N.E.2d 424, 427 (1953);
T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 48, at 217; 7B G. Markuson, Warren's Heaton, The
Procedure and Law of Surrogates' Courts of the State of New York § 100, 6, at 174
(6th ed. Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Warren's Heaton]; see Rubenstein v.
Kleven, 261 F.2d 921, 923 (1st Cir. 1958) (applying New York law); In re Estate of
Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 654, 31 N.Y.S. 2d 468, 474 (Sur. Ct. 1941); State of N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n, Act, Recommendation and Studies Relating to the Statute of
Frauds Governing Contracts Not to be Performed Within a Year or a Lifetime,
Legislative Doc. No. 65(A), at 33-34 (1957), reprinted in State of N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n, Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1957, at 15, 47-48 (1957)
[hereinafter cited as 1957 Commission Report]; see, e.g., Bayreuther v. Reinisch, 264
A.D. 138, 34 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1942), aff'd. 290 N.Y. 553, 47 N.E.2d 959 (1943); In re
Estate of Quigley, 179 Misc. 210, 38 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Sur. Ct. 1942).
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such contracts, therefore, are usually litigated without the testimony
of one of the parties to the alleged agreement.14 A heightened poten-
tial for fraudulent allegations is thus presented when the claim is
based primarily on the oral statements of the decedent.' 5 Courts
confronted with a claim of an oral contract to make a will or an oral
contract not performable within a lifetime have turned to the various
statutory protections afforded an estate against fraudulent claims such
as the Dead Man's Statute' and the Statute of Wills. 17
Dead Man's Statutes were enacted in most states during the 19th
14. See Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 285, 299, 113 N.E.2d 424, 428
(1953); Dreher v. Le y, 67 A.D.2d 438, 441, 415 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (1979); 3A
Warren's Heaton, supra note 13, § 276, 2, at 48-150; 19 St. John's L. Rev. 152, 153
(1945); 7 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 132, 133 (1960). The majority of cases within the lifetime
and testamentary provisions are litigated for the first time after the death of one of
the parties, because of the general rule that an action for breach of contract cannot
be brought until the time when performance is due. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The
Law of Contracts § 12-2, at 456 (2d ed. 1977); see B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 85-86,
90. For example, if a promisor contracts to make a reciprocal will, the promisor's
obligation would not be fulfilled unless the promisor died leaving the will in effect. I
Page, supra note 2, § 10.2, at 437; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 85-86. In a situation
where the promisor intends to act or has acted so as to make his performance under
the contract impossible, however, the promisee may bring an action for anticipatory
breach of contract. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra, §§ 12-3, 12-4; B. Sparks, supra
note 1, at 85-87, 90. For instance, if a party to a contract to make a will attempts to
defeat the contract by selling the subject matter of the contract, the other party could
bring an action to enjoin the sale. See A. Corbin, supra note 12, § 432, at 441; see,
e.g., Remele v. Hamilton, 78 Ariz. 45, 275 P.2d 403 (1954) (injunction granted);
Schondelmayer v. Schondelmayer, 320 Mich. 565, 31 N.W.2d 721 (1948) (same). In
instances of repudiation, where both parties are alive to testify, the evidentiary
problems associated with lifetime and testamentary contracts are considerably less-
ened. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
15. Notten v. Mensing, 3 Cal. 2d 469, 477, 45 P.2d 198, 202 (1935); In re Estate
of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 650, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 471 (Sur. Ct. 1941); 1 Page, supra
note 2, § 10.10, at 463-64; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 26; see Ray, supra note 9, at
90; Ohio Statute of Frauds, supra note 9, at 166-67; 7 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 132, 133
(1960).
16. See McCargo v. Steele, 160 F. Supp. 7, 14-15 (W.D. Ark.) (applying Arkan-
sas law), aff'd, 260 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1958); In re Estate of Mulderig, 196 Misc. 527,
529-30, 91 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898-99 (Sur. Ct. 1949); 9D P. Rohan, New York Civil
Practice 13-2.1[2], at 13-121 (1980); 3 Warren's Heaton, supra note 13, § 276, 1 2,
at 48-152; Schnelby, Contracts to Make Testamentary Dispositions as Affected by the
Statute of Frauds, 24 Mich. L. Rev. 749, 785 (1926); cf. In re Estate of Ditson, 177
Misc. 648, 650, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 471 (Sur. Ct. 19,11) (contracts based on oral
promises of a decedent should be corroborated by the testimony of only disinterested
witnesses).
17. See Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 299, 113 N.E.2d 424, 428
(1953); Spinks v. Rice, 187 Va. 730, 738, 47 S.E.2d 424, 428-29 (1948); A. Corbin,
supra note 12, § 432, at 441.
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century18 in response to the special evidentiary problems occasioned
by claims against decedents' estates. 9 In an effort to deter perjury,
these statutes prohibit an interested party from testifying about trans-
actions or communications with a decedent. 20 The Dead Man's Stat-
utes thus render a promisee incompetent to testify to the existence of a
contract that is based on oral communications with the decedent-
promisor.2 1
Perhaps the most important legislative safeguard afforded an estate
against false claims is the Statute of Wills.2 2 Enacted in every state,
the Statute of Wills requires all testamentary dispositions of property
to be accomplished by an unambiguous writing,2 3 signed by the testa-
18. See Ray, supra note 9, at 89-90.
19. B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 26; Ray, supra note 9, at 90; Ohio Statute of
Frauds, supra note 9, at 166-67 & n.2. The Dead Man's Statute had its inception in
an even older rule of evidence that rendered "all persons having a direct pecuniary or
proprietary interest" in the results of the suit incompetent to testify. C. McCormick,
McCormick on Evidence § 65, at 142 (E. Clear), 2d ed. 1972). In the middle to late
nineteenth century, these rules were reformed. The incompetency of interested par-
ties was generally abolished, but remained in instances of a civil suit between two
parties, one of whom was deceased. Id. It was felt that without such a rule hardship
and injustice would result, because no one could rebut the survivor's testimony as
adequately as the decedent. Dead Man's Statutes were created to codify this common
law rule. Id. at 142-43.
20. See Walling v. Couch, 292 Ala. 33, 35, 288 So. 2d 435, 436 (1973); Redwine
v. Jackson, 254 Ala. 564, 569-70, 49 So. 2d 115, 120 (1950); Renz v. Drury, 57 Kan.
84, 87, 45 P. 71, 72 (1896). The premise behind the Dead Man's Statutes is that
where the mouth of one party to a transaction is sealed by death, the lips of the
surviving party shall be closed by law, so as not to leave the decedent's estate at a
gross disadvantage. See Ray, supra note 9, at 90; Ohio Statute of Frauds, supra note
9, at 167 n.2. Only a witness who is so interested in the result of the suit as to directly
gain or lose thereby is disqualified from testifying by these statutes. C. Lilly, An
Introduction to the Law of Evidence, 66-67 (1978); C. McCormick, supra note 19, §
65, at 142.
21. 3A Warren's Heaton, supra note 13, § 276, 1 2, at 48-142 to -143, 48-154 to
-155; C. McCormick, supra note 19, § 65, at 143; 2 J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 488,
578 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979); see Eastwood v. Crane, 125 Iowa 707, 709, 101
N.W. 481, 482 (1904); Farrington v. Richardson, 153 Fla. 907, 910-12, 16 So. 2d
158, 160-62 (1944).
22. Spinks v. Rice. 187 Va. 730, 744, 47 S.E.2d 424, 430 (1948); see Rubin v.
Irving Trust Co. 305 N.Y. 288, 298-99, 113 N.E.2d 424, 427-28, (1953); In re Estate
of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 654, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 475 (Sur. Ct. 1941); 2 Page, supra
note 2, § 19.4, at 66.
23. In re Estate of Kerr, 433 F.2d 479, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1970); T. Atkinson, supra
note 1, § 62, at 294; G. Bogert, supra note 2, § 22, at 55; 2 Page, supra note 2, § 19.5,
at 70; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 127; see Sherman v. Johnson, 159 Ohio St. 209,
221-22, 112 N.E.2d 326, 333 (1953); see, e.g., N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law §
13-2.1(a)(2) (McKinney 1967); Cal. Prob. Code § 50 (West 1956); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch.
110 1/2, § 4-3 (Smith-Hurd 1978); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 700.122(1) (1980).
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tor,24 and attested to by one or more witnesses.2 5  The formalities
required by the Statute of Wills reflect the strong public policy that
disposition of an estate accord with the deliberately expressed inten-
tions of the testator.26 By requiring a writing, the Statute of Wills not
only ensures that evidence of the testator's intentions will be available
to defeat fraudulent claims, 2 7 but also assures the court that those
intentions were reached with an element of deliberation, 8
Although the Dead Man's Statutes and the Statute of Wills afford
some safeguards against claims that might defeat a testator's wishes,2 "
they are insufficient to protect an estate against fraudulent allegations
of a contract with the decedent. 30 First, Dead Man's Statutes do not
prevent subornation of perjury. Persons not privy to the transaction
24. T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 64, at 297; C. Bogert, supra note 2, § 22, at 55; 2
Page, supra note 2, § 19.40, at 127-28; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 127; see Sherman
v. Johnson, 159 Ohio St. 209, 221-22, 112 N.E.2d 326, 333 (1953); see, e.g., N.Y.
Est., Powers & Trusts Law § 13-2.1(a)(2) (McKinney 1967); Cal. Prob. Code § 50(1)(West 1956); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 110 1/2, § 4-3 (Smith-Hurd 1978); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 700.122(1) (1980).
25. T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 65, at 308; G. Bogert, supra note 2, § 22, at 55; 2
Page, supra note 2, § 19.75, at 174-75; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 127; see In re
Estate of O'Connor, 236 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973 (Sur. Ct. 1962); Sherman v. Johnson, 159
Ohio St. 209, 221-22, 112 N.E.2d 326, 333 (1953); see, e.g., N.Y. Est., Powers &
Trusts Law § 13-2.1(4) (MeKinney 1967); Cal. Prob. Code § 50(4) (West 1956); I11.
Ann. Stat. ch. 110 1/2, § 4-3 (Smith-Hurd 1978); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §
700.122(1) (1980).
26. Oursler v. Armstrong, 10 N.Y.2d 385, 389, 179 N.E.2d 489, 490, 223
N.Y.S.2d 477, 479 (1961); B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 25-26, 48; see First Gulf Beach
Bank & Trust Co. v. Crubaugh, 330 So. 2d 205, 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976);
Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 300-01, 113 N.E.2d 424, 428-29 (1953); In
re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 654, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 475 (Sur. Ct. 1941); 2 Page,
supra note 2, § 19.4, at 66-67.
27. Sherman v. Johnson, 159 Ohio St. 209, 221-22, 112 N.E.2d 326, 333 (1953);
2 Page, supra note 2, § 19.3, at 62-63; A. Scott, supra note 1, § 55.9, at 133; see
Spinks v. Rice, 187 Va. 730, 744, 47 S.E.2d 424, 430 (1948); Fuller, supra note 1, at
803.
28. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 13, at 33, reprinted in 1957
Commission Report, supra note 13, at 47; see First Gulf Beach Bank & Trust Co. v.
Grubaugh, 330 So. 2d 205, 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Sherman v. Johnson, 159
Ohio St. 209, 221-22, 112 N.E. 2d 326, 333 (1953); cf. Fuller, supra note 1, at 800,
803 (one who is compelled to furnish a memorial of his intention is usually induced to
deliberate before writing).
29. See In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 654, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 475 (Sur. Ct.
1941); B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 26, 38; supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
30. 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.10, at 463-64, § 10.11, at 467; B. Sparks, supra
note 1, at 26, 38; see O'Brien v. O'Brien, 197 Cal. 577, 586-87, 241 P. 861, 864
(1925); In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 654, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 475 (Sur. Ct.
1941); State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 13, at 33, reprinted in 1957
Commission Report, supra note 13, at 47; 3A Warren's Heaton, supra note 13, § 276,
2, at 48-154.
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such as a spouse or a sibling are not disqualified by these statutes" and
may falsely testify as to oral statements made by the decedent-promi-
sor that tend to show the alleged contract. 3- The Dead Man's Stat-
utes, therefore, cannot effectively deter the assertion of fraudulent
contractual claims against decedents' estates.33
Second, the Statute of Wills does not preclude enforcement of
contracts requiring a testamentary disposition of property.3 In fact,
such contracts generally are enforceable, 35 even if based on an oral
agreement with the decedent, 36 despite recognition that these con-
tracts circumvent the Statute of Wills. 37 In the absence of a statutory
31. 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.45, at 536; e.g., Evans v. Mason, 82 Ariz. 40,
47-48, 308 P.2d 245, 250 (1957) (promisee's assignee not incompetent to testify);
Brewer v. Mackey, 177 Ga. 813, 814, 171 S.E. 273, 273 (1933) (daughter not
incompetent to testify); Hamar v. Isachsen, 58 A.D.2d 988, 989, 397 N.Y.S.2d 485,
486 (1977) (husband not incompetent to testify); In re Estate of Manchester, 279
A.D. 254, 255, 110 N.Y.S.2d 107, 109 (1952) (wife not incompetent to testify); Tracy
v. Danzinger, 253 A.D. 418, 422, 3 N.Y.S.2d 24, 27 (husband not incompetent to
testify), aff'd, 279 N.Y. 679, 18 N.E.2d 311 (1938); Hungerford v. Snow, 129 A.D.
816, 818, 114 N.Y.S. 127, 128-29 (1909) (same).
32. 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.10, at 464; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 26, 38.
When a lifetime or a testamentary contract is oral, circumstantial evidence often
tends to show that a contract existed, especially when a witness close to the situation,
such as a wife or child, testifies to that effect. After the promisor is dead, rebutting
evidence may be difficult to find. Id. at 26.
33. B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 26, 38; see Doby v. Williams, 53 N.J. Super. 548,
552-53, 148 A.2d 42, 45 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1959); C. McCormick, supra note 19,
§ 65, at 143,44.
34. Hale v. Wilmarth, 274 Mass. 186, 189, 174 N.E. 232, 234 (1931); 1 Page,
supra note 2, § 10.11, at 467; see authorities cited infra notes 35-36.
35. Pitt v. United States, 319 F.2d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 1963) (applying Missouri
law); McCargo v. Steele, 160 F. Supp. 7, 15 (W.D. Ark.) (applying Arkansas law),
aff'd, 260 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1958); Redke v. Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 100, 490 P.2d
805, 808, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293, 296 (1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1971);
Rodgers v. Street, 215 Ga. 643, 644, 112 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1960); In re Estate of
Guest, 35 Ill. App. 2d 434, 439, 183 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1962); Drewen v. Bank of the
Manhattan Co., 31 N.J. 110, 116, 155 A.2d 529, 532 (1959); In re Liggins Estate, 393
Pa. 500, 503, 143 A.2d 349, 351 (1958); T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 48, at 210; 1
Page, supra note 2, § 10.1, at432-34, § 10.11, at 464, 467; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at
18; G. Thompson, supra note 1, § 16, at 34.
36. Pitt v. United States, 319 F.2d 564, 567 (8th Cir. 1963) (applying Missouri
law); Rodgers v. Street, 215 Ga. 643, 644, 112 S.E.2d 598, 599 (1960); Brewer v.
Mackey, 177 Ga. 813, 814, 171 S.E. 273, 273-74 (1933); Lawrence v. Oglesby, 178
Ill. 122, 128, 52 N.E. 945, 946 (1899); Gerard v. Steinbock, 169 Neb. 828, 830-32,
101 N.W.2d 194, 197 (1960); Doby v. Williams, 53 N.J. Super. 548, 552-53, 148
A.2d 42, 45 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1959); In re Liggins Estate, 393 Pa. 500, 505-06,
143 A.2d 349, 351 (1958); T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 48, at 210; 1 Page, supra note
2, § 10.1, at 432-34, § 10.10, at 463-64; G. Thompson, supra note 1, § 16, at 34.
37. 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.11, at 467; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 15 nn.
52-54; see Donner v. Donner, 302 So. 2d 452, 459-60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974);
Hale v. Wilmarth, 274 Mass. 186, 188-89, 174 N.E. 232, 233-34 (1931); Doby v.
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writing requirement, courts have required clear and convincing evi-
dence of the alleged agreement. 38 While this high standard of proof
might provide some evidentiary safeguards against fraud, 39 it does not
diminish the number of claims asserted, because the case must go to
the merits to establish the proof. 40 Both parties might feel more
satisfied that they had their day in court and argued fully. Neverthe-
less, the increased number of cases heard that would still be dismissed
because of failure to provide conclusive evidence of an actual agree-
ment would inflict a severe blow to judicial economy and force estates
to defend spurious claims. 41
Furthermore, the other protections afforded by the Statute of Wills'
writing requirement, such as deliberateness, are not addressed by
merely imposing a higher evidentiary standard. 42 Ignoring the im-
Williams, 53 N.J. Super. 548, 553, 148 A.2d 42, 45 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1959). But
see Spinks v. Rice, 187 Va. 730, 743-44, 47 S.E.2d 424, 430 (1948) ("If the validity of
this instrument be established, it would accomplish a clear evasion of the statute of
wills.").
38. 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.43, at 527-29; e.g., Martel v. Carlson, 118 So. 2d
592, 594 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Rodgers v. Street, 215 Ga. 643, 644, 112 S.E.2d
598, 599-600 (1960); Brewer v. Mackey, 177 Ga. 813, 814, 171 S.E. 273, 273-74
(1933); Doby v. Williams, 53 N.J. Super. 548, 552-53, 148 A.2d 42, 45 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1959); In re Liggins Estate, 393 Pa. 500, 505, 143 A.2d 349, 352 (1958).
39. See Morton v. Yell, 239 Ark. 195, 197, 388 S.W.2d 88, 89 (1965). But see B.
Sparks, supra note 1, at 24-26 (courts pay lip service to rule requiring a higher
standard of proof).
40. See B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 22-38 (discussing problems associated with the
application of clear and convincing standard of proof). Enacting lifetime and testa-
mentary provisions would check the flood of claims against estates that apparently
were not checked by the high standard of proof generally required in the absence of
these provisions. See Bayreuther v. LaGuardia, 176 Misc. 547, 548, 25 N.Y.S.2d 620,
621-22 (Sup. Ct. 1941); State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Act, Recommendation
and Study relating to Section 31, Subdivision 8, of the New York Personal Property
Law, 1946 Legislative Doc. No. 65(I), at 15 (1946), reprinted in State of N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law Revision Commission for 1946, at 267, 281
(1946) [hereinafter cited as 1946 Comm'n Report]; 3 Brooklyn L. Rev. 150, 154
(1933); 19 St. John's L. Rev. 152, 152-53 (1945).
41. See State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Act, Recommendation and Studies
relating to the Statute of Frauds Governing Contracts Not to be Performed Within a
Year or a Lifetime, 1953 N.Y. Legislative Doc. No. 65(0), at 23 (1953), reprinted in
State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, Report of the Law Revision Commission for
1953, at 533, 555 (1953) [hereinafter cited as 1953 Commission Report]; A. Corbin
supra note 12, § 275, at 374, 381-82; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 48.
42. See State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 41, at 22-23, reprinted
in 1953 Commission Report, supra note 41, at 554-55; State of N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n, supra note 40, at 3, reprinted in 1946 Commission Report, supra note 40,
at 281; T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 62, at 292-93; 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.10, at
463; 3 Brooklyn L. Rev. 150, 154 (1933); cf. In re Tschirky, 206 Misc. 868, 871, 135
N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (Sur. Ct. 1954) (contracts requiring testamentary performance
should be in writing).
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portance of deliberation in the context of a testamentary agreement is
particularly troublesome, because "parties are probably less likely to
accurately express themselves concerning contracts to devise or be-
queath than upon any other kind of transaction." 43 The belief that
performance is in the distant future often prevents the parties from
fully exploring and comprehending the obligations attendant to the
agreement. 44 Because contracts making a testamentary disposition of
property are irrevocable 45 and can defeat the intended disposition of a
testator's will, 46 careful deliberation is of paramount importance.
4 7
This problem has been ameliorated, however, in those states that have
enacted specific Statute of Frauds' provisions to cover contracts mak-
ing a testamentary disposition and contracts not performable within a
lifetime.48
43. B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 22; see G. Bogert & G. Bogert, The Law of Trusts
and Trustees § 480, at 202-03 (rev. 2d ed. 1978).
44. See B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 32-34. People tend to think of death as an
occurrence in the distant future. D. Coon, Introduction to Ps'chology 293 (2d ed.
1980). As a result, contracts requiring performance at or after death often are made
without a full appreciation of the obligations assumed. See B. Sparks, supra note 1, at
32-34.
45. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
46. See Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 299, 113 N.E.2d 424, 428
(1953); Frieders v. Estate of Frieders, 180 Wis. 430, 433-34, 193 N.V. 77, 78-79
(1923); 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.3, at 44143; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 162. If a
contract to make a will is enforceable, the promisee has rights similar to a creditor,
because the claims are settled before disposition of the estate according to the will.
See id.
47. See B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 200. A writing prevents "the making of
ill-considered oral contracts to dispose of property after death." State of N.Y. Law
Revision Comm'n, supra note 13, at 33, reprinted in 1957 Commission Report, supra
note 13, at 47.
48. See In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 654, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 475 (Sur. Ct.
1941); 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.10, at 463; Ohio Statute of Frauds, supra note 9, at
166-67. Other jurisdictions have recognized the need for a writing requirement to
cover lifetime and testamentary contracts as evidenced by their efforts to fit these
contracts within other Statute of Frauds' provisions. I Page, supra note 2, § 10.11, at
464-65; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 41-44. For example, contracts to devise land are
often decided under the provision governing transfers of an interest in land. T.
Atkinson, supra note 1, § 48, at 213; 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.11, at 465 & n.6; B.
Sparks, supra note 1, at 41; e.g., Vickers v. Pegues, 247 Ala. 624, 626, 25 So. 2d 720,
722 (1946); Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 177 Md. 248, 253-55, 9 A.2d 639, 641 (1939);
Humphrey v. Fason, 247 N.C. 127, 134, 100 S.E.2d 524, 530 (1957). Similarly,
contracts to bequeath personalty valued over a specified amount are sometimes
interpreted within the sale of goods provision. I Page, supra note 2, § 10.11, at 467 &
n.10; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 41-42 & n.11. But see I G. Palmer, The Law of
Restitution § 4.21, at 549 & n.4 (1978) (noting jurisdictions that do not extend sale of
goods provisions to testamentary contracts). These provisions, however, are not
created to protect decedents' estates against fraudulent claims, but to control sales of
land and goods. Where a contract cannot be completed before the end of a lifetime,
and does not involve goods or land, such as a bequest of money, or a promise to
support for life, there is no other Statute of Frauds' provision to protect against
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II. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS: COMPLETING THE SPHERE OF PROTECTIONS"
A. The Provisions
1. The Testamentary Provision
In those states with a testamentary provision, 49 an agreement to
devise or bequeath is considered a contract to make a will5 ° that must
satisfy the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds. Because only
contracts to make a will fall within the Statute of Frauds' testamen-
tary provision, courts in these states must determine the nature of the
transaction in question. Fine distinctions must, therefore, be made
between gifts causa mortis, wills, and contracts to make a will.0'
A gift causa mortis is an existing intent to donate coupled with the
transfer of a property interest prior to the death of the donor. 52 Here
death acts to preclude revocation of the already transferred property
interest.5 3 A will, by definition, is an ambulatory instrument, inoper-
fraudulent claims. A growing number of states have recently adopted § 2-701 of the
Uniform Probate Code as an alternative vehicle to achieving the evidentiary purpose
behind the Statute of Frauds' testamentary provision. Uniform Probate Code §
2-701, 8 U.L.A. 364 (1972). Section 2-701 provides that a contract to devise or
bequeath can be established in one of the following instances if: (1) the will sets forth
the material provisions of the contract; or (2) express reference to the contract is
made in the will and substantiated by extrinsic evidence; or (3) a writing evidencing
the contract is signed by the decedent. Id. Although this statute was specifically
enacted to cover testamentary contracts, the statute, on its face, does not cover those
agreements not to be completed before the end of a lifetime that are not contracts to
devise realty or personalty. See id. Twelve states have enacted legislation similar to §
2-701. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-11-701 (1973); Idaho Code § 15-2-701 (1979); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 394.540 (Supp. 1980); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.2-701 (West 1975); Mo. Ann.
Stat. § 474.155 (Vernon Supp. 1981); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3A: 2A-19 (West Supp. 1981);
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 45-2-701 (1978); N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-09-13 (1976); Or. Rev.
Stat. § 112.270 (1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-308 (Supp. 1981); Utah Code Ann. §
75-2-701 (1978). One state, Texas, has enacted a rigid statute that allows the contract
to be established only if the material provisions of it are in the will. Tex. Prob. Code
Ann. § 59A (Vernon 1980).
49. See supra note 10.
50. Evans v. Mason, 82 Ariz. 40, 44-45, 308 P.2d 2,45, 248 (1957); Hastoupis v.
Gargas, 398 N.E.2d 745, 750 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); In re Adams, 1 A.D.2d 259,
262, 149 N.Y.S.2d 849, 853 (1956), aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d 796, 140 N.E.2d 549, 159
N.Y.S.2d 698 (1957). But see Moore v. Curtzweiler, 165 Ohio St. 194, 197-98, 134
N.E.2d 835, 838 (1956) (contract for services, where the employer recognized a
present duty to pay, but postponed payment until after his death, held not a contract
to make a will); Weber v. Billman, 165 Ohio St. 431, 437-39, 135 N.E.2d 866, 870-71
(1956) (same).
51. Spinks v. Rice, 187 Va. 730, 740-42, 47 S.E.2d 424, 428-29 (1948); T.
Atkinson, supra note 1, § 44, at 193-94, 210-11; see A. Scott, supra note 1, § 55.1, at
126-27.
52. Spinks v. Rice, 187 Va. 730, 742, 47 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1948); T. Atkinson,
supra note 1, § 45, at 200-05.
53. Spinks v. Rice, 187 Va. 730, 742, 47 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1948); T. Atkinson,
supra note 1, § 45, at 200-01, 204-05.
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ative and revocable until the death of the testator. 4 No rights or
property interests vest until death.5 5 A contract to make a will, on
the other hand, is an irrevocable agreement, supported by consider-
ation, that immediately transfers a contract right, but does not trans-
fer a property interest until the death of the promisor.56
Wills and contracts to make a will can often be confused in cases
where a husband and wife make joint57 or reciprocal wills. 55 Joint
testaments may show evidence of a common understanding or inten-
tion, but an understanding does not necessarily indicate that the
parties intended to form a contract.59 Two persons may validly agree
to dispose of their estates in a particular manner by means of a joint or
mutual will. Mere execution of a joint testament, without further
evidence, however, does not establish a contractual obligation.o Ju-
54. Donner v. Donner, 302 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974): Busque v.
Marcou, 147 Me. 289, 295-97, 86 A.2d 873, 877 (1952); Spinks v. Rice, 187 Va. 730,
737-39, 47 S.E.2d 424, 427-28 (1948); T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 1, at 2-3: 1 Page,
supra note 2, § 10.3, at 439-40.
55. Spinks v. Rice. 187 Va. 730, 737-39, 47 S.E.2d 424, 427-28 (1948): T.
Atkinson, supra note 1, § 1, at 2-3; 1 Page, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 3.
56. Remele v. Hamilton, 78 Ariz. 45, 51-52, 275 P.2d 403, 408 (1954); Equitable
Trust Co. v. Hollingsworth, 29 Del. Ch. 563, 567, 49 A.2d 325, 327 (1946); Spinks v.
Rice, 187 Va. 730, 742, 47 S.E.2d 424, 429 (1948); A. Scott, supra note 1, § 55.1, at
126-27; see T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 48, at 210-11.
57. A joint will is a single testamentary instrument that contains the wills of two
or more persons and disposes of property owned jointly, in common, or in severalty
by them. In re Brown, 26 Misc. 2d 1011, 1019, 209 N.Y.S.2d 465, 474 (Sur. Ct.
1961); T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 49, at 222-24.
58. Reciprocal wills, also called mutual wills, are created when two individuals
execute "separate wills which are, in part at least, reciprocal or identical in their
provisions as the result of some preconcerted plan." T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 49,
at 222.
59. Kimmel v. Roberts, 179 Neb. 8, 15, 136 N.W.2d 208, 212 (1965) (McCown,
J., concurring); In re Estate of Bainer, 71 A.D.2d 728, 728, 419 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229
(1979); In re Estate of Rothwachs, 57 Misc.2d 152, 155, 290 N.Y.S.2d 781, 785 (Sur.
Ct. 1968); B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 27-28. Many states have enacted statutes
stating that the existence of a joint will does not create a presumption of a contract.
E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-11-701 (1973); Idaho Code § 15-2-701 (1979); Ky. Rev.
Stat. § 394.540 (1972); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 524.2-701 (West 1975). Mo. Ann. Stat. §
474.155 (Vernon Supp. 1981); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 3A: 2A-19 (West Supp. 1981); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 45-2-701 (1975); N.D. Cent. Code § 30.1-09-13 (1976); Or. Rev. Stat. §
112.270 (1979); Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-308 (Supp. 1981); Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-701
(1978).
60. Kimmel v. Roberts, 179 Neb. 8, 11, 136 N.W.2d 208, 210 (1965); Rich v.
Mottek, 11 N.Y.2d 90, 94, 181 N.E.2d 445, 447, 226 N.Y.S.2d 428, 431 (1962): In re
Estate of Bainer, 71 A.D.2d 728, 728, 419 N.Y.S.2d 228, 229 (1979); Class v.
Battista, 56 A.D.2d 806, 806, 392 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (1977), affd, 43 N.Y.2d 620,
374 N.E.2d 116, 403 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1978); B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 27-28 & n.24.
Although the mere existence of a joint will does not establish an enforceable agree-
ment, the language and the circumstances surrounding its making may sufficiently
demonstrate a contract. Wagner v. Wagner, 58 A.D.2d 7, 10-11, 395 N.Y.S.2d 641
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
dicial policy has been one of great reluctance to restrict the ambula-
tory nature of a will, absent clear and convincing evidence of an
intention to contract.
2. The Lifetime Provision
The lifetime provision requires that a contract be in writing if the
agreement cannot be completed before the end of a lifetime. 2 This
provision has been strictly construed to encompass only those agree-
ments that are, by their terms, incapable of full performance within a
lifetime.6 3 Generally, the endurance of the promisor's obligation is
deemed the deciding factor.6 4 If, by the terms of the contract, that
obligation ceases simultaneously with and not before the end of the
promisor's lifetime, the contract falls within the Statute of Frauds'
provision.A5 For example, an assignment or a promise to assign a life
insurance policy has been held to fall within the lifetime provision
because, implicit in the agreement is the promise not only to name,
643 (1977), af-'d mem., 44 N.Y.2d 780, 377 N.E.2d 482, 406 N.Y.S.2d 38 (1978); see
B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 30-31.
61. Oursler v. Armstrong, 10 N.Y.2d 385, 389, 179 N.E.2d 489, 490, 223
N.Y.S.2d 477, 479 (1961); In re Estate of Bainer, 71 A.D.2d 728, 728, 419 N.Y.S.2d
228, 229 (1979); In re Estate of Rothwachs, 57 Misc. 2d 152, 155, 290 N.Y.S.2d 781,
785 (Sur. Ct. 1968); In re Estate of Aquilino, 53 Misc. 2d 811, 812, 280 N.Y.S.2d 85,
86-87 (Sur. Ct. 1967); B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 30. Where one of the parties to a
joint or reciprocal will executes a new will in violation of the previous one, the later
instrument is recognized as his last testament. T. Atkinson, supra note 1, § 48, at
217-18, § 49, at 224. If a contract to execute a joint testament is established,
however, the agreement will be enforceable against the beneficiaries of the subse-
quent will. Tutunjian v. Vetzigian, 299 N.Y. 315, 319, 87 N.E.2d 275, 277 (1949);
Glass v. Battista, 56 A.D.2d 806, 806, 392 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655 (1977), affid, 43 N.Y.2d
620, 374 N.E.2d 116, 403 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1978).
62. In re Adams, 1 A.D.2d 259, 262, 149 N.Y.S.2d 849, 853 (1956), aff'd mein.,
2 N.Y.2d 796, 140 N.E.2d 549, 159 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1957); In re Estate of Albin, 35
Misc. 2d 322, 325, 230 N.Y.S.2d 750, 753 (Sur. Ct. 1962); e.g., Gold v. Killeen, 44
Ariz. 291, 33 P.2d 595 (1934); Bayreuther v. Reinisch, 264 A.D. 138, 34 N.Y.S.2d
674 (1942), aff'd, 290 N.Y. 553, 47 N.E.2d 959 (1943).
63. See, e.g., Bonnear v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 84 Cal. App. 2d
107, 110-11, 190 P.2d 307, 309 (1948); In re Estate of Albin, 35 Misc. 2d 322, 325,
230 N.Y.S.2d 750, 754 (Sur. Ct. 1962).
64. E.g., Rubenstein v. Kleven, 261 F.2d 921, 924 (1st Cir. 1958) (applying New
York law); Harris v. Home Indem. Co., 16 Misc. 2d 586, 587, 190 N.Y.S.2d 157, 158
(Sup. Ct. 1957), aff'd, 6 A.D.2d 861, 175 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1958); see In re Estate of
Albin, 35 Misc. 2d 322, 325, 230 N.Y.S.2d 750, 754 (Sur. Ct. 1962); Weber v.
Billman, 165 Ohio St. 431, 435, 135 N.E.2d 866, 869 (1956); cf. Martocci v. Greater
N.Y. Brewery, 301 N.Y. 57, 92 N.E.2d 887 (1950) (similar analysis under one-year
provision of the Statute of Frauds).
65. In re Estate of Douglas, 169 Misc. 716, 717, 8 N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (Sur. Gt.
1938), aff'd, 256 A.D. 908, 10 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1939).
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but also not to change the beneficiary before the promisor's death.",
Other fact patterns include contracts for the sale of a business contain-
ing an agreement not to compete for life, 67 agreements regarding the
continuation of a partnership after a partner's death,68 and contracts
for lifetime employment. 69
Contracts that may be terminated, but not completed, by the death
of a party, however, are not covered by the lifetime provisions. 0  For
example, in a contract to support a child for a fixed term of years, the
child could conceivably die within the term of the contract. Should
the child die, the promisor's obligation would not be fully performed,
but merely excused, 7 and thus the contract would not fall within the
lifetime provision. A corollary of this rule is that contracts imposing
an indefinite obligation on a defendant, such as agreements for per-
manent employment, are not within the lifetime provision. -12 Perma-
nent indicates merely that the contract will continue indefinitely;
66. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 13, at 35, reprinted in 1957
Commission Report, supra note 13, at 49; e.g.. Mohawk Airlines v. Peach, 61
A.D.2d 346, 402 N.Y.S.2d 496 (1978); Goldberg v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 284 A.D.
678, 134 N.Y.S.2d 865 (1954); Bayreuther v. Reinisch, 264 A.D. 138. 34 N.Y.S.2d
674, aff'd, 290 N.Y. 553, 47 N.E.2d 959 (1943); May v. Prudential Ins. Co., 93
N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct. 1949). But see Katzman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 197,
128 N.E.2d 307 (1955) (oral promise to assign coupled with assignment and delivery
of life insurance policy to promisee rendered promise enforceable as a completed
inter vivos gift, which was not rendered unenforceable by the Statute of Frauds).
While a promise to assign a life insurance policy has been implicitly interpreted
within the lifetime provision, Alaska and New York expressly include assignments of
life, health, and accident insurance policies within the Statute of Frauds. In Alaska,
the clause was incorporated, by definition, within the lifetime provision. Alaska Stat.
§ 09.25.010(2) (1973). New York, however, created a separate provision encompass-
ing life, health, and accident insurance. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(a)(9)
(McKinney 1978).
67. E.g., Dunbar Camps, Inc. v. Amster, 303 N.Y. 958, 106 N.E.2d 53 (1952);
Weiss v. Weiss, 268 A.D. 1058, 52 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1945).
68. E.g., Dreher v. Levy, 67 A.D.2d 438, 415 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1979); Evangelista
v. Longo, 203 N.Y.S.2d 341 (Sup. Ct. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 13 A.D.2d 835,
216 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1961).
69. E.g., Rubenstein v. Kleven, 261 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1958) (applying New York
law); O'Keeffe v. Bry, 456 F. Supp. 822 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying New York law);
Remele v. Hamilton, 78 Ariz. 45, 275 P.2d 403 (1954). Because contracts to make a
will cannot be fully completed before the testator's death, they may also fall within
the lifetime provision. In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 31 N.Y.S.2d 46S (Sur.
Ct. 1941); State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 13, at 34, reprinted in
1957 Commission Report, supra note 13, at 48.
70. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-20, at 707 & n.37, 708 &
n.39.
71. See id. § 19-20, at 707-08; 3 Brooklyn L. Rev. 150, 151 (1933).
72. Rubenstein v. Kleven, 261 F.2d 921, 922-23 (1st Cir. 1958) (applying New
York law); Brown v. Babcock, 265 A.D. 596, 599, 40 N.Y.S.2d 428, 431 (1943).
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performance could, however, be completed before the end of a life-
time.73
Jurisdictions having a lifetime provision differ on the question of
whose lifetime should form the predicate for application of the statu-
tory writing requirement. Arizona,74 California75 and Hawaii 70 re-
quire a writing only where the time for performance of the contract is
measured by the life of the promisor. New York77 and Alaska, 8
however, do not expressly address whose lifetime must determine the
duration of the parties' contractual obligations in order to invoke the
Statute's writing requirements. Courts in New York have broadly
construed the Statute to encompass contracts measured by the lifetime
of the promisor, 79 the promisee,80 or a third person.8 1
B. The Safeguards
An examination of the general functions of the Statute of Frauds
demonstrates that the safeguards provided by its writing requirement
are particularly beneficial whenever an individual seeks to make or
enforce an agreement that takes effect at or after death.8 2
73. Rubenstein v. Kleven, 261 F.2d 921, 922-23 (1st Cir. 1958) (applying Now
York law); see Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock Co., 249 N.Y. 439, 442-43, 164 N.E. 342,
343 (1928); Brown v. Babcock, 265 A.D. 596, 599, 40 N.Y.S.2d 428, 431 (1943); cf.
J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 2-13, at 48 (permanent employment
generally means a hiring at will).
74. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-101(8) (1967).
75. Cal. Civ. Code § 1624(6) (West 1973).
76. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 656-1(7) (1976 & Supp. 1980).
77. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 5-701(a)(1) (McKinney 1978).
78. Alaska Stat. § 09.25.010(2) (1973).
79. E.g., Dunbar Camps, Inc. v. Amster, 303 N.Y. 958, 959, 106 N.E.2d 53, 53
(1952); Mohawk Airlines v. Peach, 61 A.D.2d 346, 351, 402 N.Y.S.2d 496, 498-99
(1978).
80. E.g., Goldberg v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 284 A.D. 678, 680, 134 N.Y.S.2d
865, 868-69 (1954); Tinto v. Howard, 52 N.Y.S.2d 245, 245-46 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
aff'd, 269 A.D. 990, 59 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1945).
81. E.g., Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 302 N.Y. 523, 525, 99 N.E. 679, 679-80
(1951); Shookoff v. Salzberg, 134 N.Y.S.2d 556, 560 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Termincllo v.
Bleecker, 155 Misc. 702, 704-05, 280 N.Y.S. 326, 329 (City Ct. 1935); see Bayreuther
v. Reinisch, 264 A.D. 138, 141, 34 N.Y.S.2d 674, 677 (1942), ajJ'd, 290 N.Y. 553, 47
N.E.2d 959 (1943).
82. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 40, at 15, reprinted in 1946
Commission Report, supra note 40, at 281; 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.10, at 463-64; 3
Brooklyn L. Rev. 150, 153-54; see A. Scott, supra note 1, § 55.9, at 133. It would
seem that there is less danger of perjured testimony where the transaction is Inter
vivos than where it is testamentary in character. See id. § 55.9, at 133.
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1. Safeguards When Making the Agreement
One function of the Statute of Frauds' writing requirement "is to
caution the promisor that he is entering into a binding relationship," 8
thus preventing hastily spoken words from later being interpreted as a
contract.8 4 Having to write out the agreement insures that the promi-
sor recognizes his commitments85 and, at the same time, clarifies his
intentions.86 Not all contracts, however, require such safeguards for
the promisor. 7 Rigid writing requirements have been imposed only
for those transactions of importance to both society and the parties,"
or those situations where the parties' intentions could be miscon-
strued. 89 In the former, such as contracts in consideration of mar-
riage or for the transfer of real property, a writing requirement serves
to impress on the promisor the significance and seriousness of his
action. 90 In the latter, such as promises to answer for the debt of
another or to assign an insurance policy, it serves to ensure that the
promisor has, in fact, assumed a binding obligation.9'
Because agreements within the lifetime or testamentary provisions
usually involve serious, long-term commitments as well as the disposi-
tion of estates,9 2 it is in the best interests of both society and the parties
83. Perillo, The Statute of Frauds in the Light of the Functions and Dysfunctions
of Form, 43 Fordham L. Rev. 39, 53 (1974); see Note, Statute of Frauds: Section
Seventeen in the Light of Two and a Half Centuries, 13 Cornell L.Q. 303, 304
(1928).
84. Note, The Statute of Frauds and Comparative Legal Histonj, 63 L. Q. Rev.
174, 178 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Legal Histonj]; see B. Sparks, supra note 1, at
34; cf. Fuller, supra note 1, at 803-04 (writing requirement promotes deliberation
and ensures testamentary intention).
85. Perillo, supra note 83, at 54; Fuller, supra note 1, at 804; Equitable Estop-
pel, supra note 11, at 170; Ohio Statute of Frauds, supra note 9, at 167.
86. See Knight v. Smith, 250 Ala. 113, 115, 33 So. 2d 242, 244 (1947); Fuller,
supra note 1, at 803; Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 170; Ohio Statute of
Frauds, supra note 9, at 167.
87. A. Scott, supra note 1, § 40, at 96; Fuller, supra note 1, at 805-06.
88. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 41, at 24-25, reprinted in
1953 Commission Report, supra note 41, at 556-57; A. Scott, supra note 1, § 40, at
96; 19 St. John's L. Rev. 152, 152 (1945); see 3A Warren's Heaton, supra note 13, §
276, 1 2, at 48-150; Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 170.
89. G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 43, § 480, at 203-06; Perillo, supra note
83, at 56-58; see 9D P. Rohan, supra note 16, 13-2.1[4], at 13-127 to -129.
90. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 41, at 23, reprinted in 1953
Commission Report, supra note 41, at 555; Fuller, supra note 1, at 803-04; Perillo,
supra note 83, at 53-56; Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 170. See generally 2 A.
Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 396, at 417-18, § 460, at 453 (1950) (real property;
marriage).
91. Fuller, supra note 7, at 803-04; Perillo, supra note 83, at 54. See generally, 2
A. Corbin, supra note 90, § 347, at 399400 (debt); R. Keeton, Basic Text on
Insurance Law § 4.11(d), at 250-52 (1971) (assignment of insurance policies).
92. See supra notes 5, 12, 13 and accompanying text.
253
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
that such contracts not be premised on words spoken without deliber-
ation. 93 The imposition of a writing requirement allows the parties to
reflect on the wisdom and risks attendant to their agreement. 4 Fur-
thermore, these types of contracts generally arise in the context of a
family relationship,9 5 where it is easy to misinterpret words of gratui-
tous intention as a promise of binding obligation."' In these situa-
tions, the conduct and expressions of the parties are necessarily ambig-
uous; 17 they may be performed out of love and affection, or they may
be rendered with expectation of compensation. 98 Requiring the par-
93. In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 649-51, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 471-72 (Sur.
Ct. 1941); State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 13, at 32, reprinted in
1957 Commission Report, supra note 13, at 46; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 48; cf.
State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 41, at 23, reprinted in 1953
Commission Report, supra note 41, at 555 (Requiring the deliberate act of a writing
serves "not only to benefit the parties and tribunal, . . . but also to protect third
persons whose interests may be affected.").
94. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 41, at 23, reprinted in 1953
Commission Report, supra note 41, at 555; Fuller, supra note 1, at 803-04; Perillo,
supra note 83, at 54.
95. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 13, at 31, reprinted in 1957
Commission Report, supra note 13, at 45; G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 43, §
480, at 189, 202-05; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 44-45; Schnebly, supra note 16, at
749-50.
96. In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 652, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 473 (Sur. Ct.
1941); State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 41, at 25, reprinted in 1953
Commission report, supra note 41, at 557; G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 43, §
480, at 203-05; see Mateza v. Walker, 469 F. Supp. 1276, 1278 (D. Mass. 1979)
(applying Massachusetts' law); In re Adams, 1 A.D.2d 259, 261-62, 149 N.Y.S.2d
849, 853 (1956), aff'd mere., 2 N.Y.2d 796, 140 N.E.2d 549, 159 N.Y.S.2d 698
(1957). Because so many of these cases concern services performed for a relative, such
as care, companionship, and emotional support, a sympathetic judge or jury might
be inclined to find a contract if a writing requirement was not mandated. B. Sparks,
supra note 1, at 44-45; see Knight v. Smith, 250 Ala. 113, 116, 33 So. 2d 242, 244
(1947) (Brown, J., dissenting); Morton v. Yell, 239 Ark. 195, 196-97, 388 S.W.2d 88,
89-90 (1965); Oursler v. Armstrong, 10 N.Y.2d 385, 388-89, 179 N.E.2d 489, 490,
223 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478-79 (1961); In re Estate of O'Connor, 236 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973
(Sur. Ct. 1962); In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 651-52, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 473
(Sur. Ct. 1941).
97. In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 652, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 473 (Sur. Ct.
1941); B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 34. "[W]here promises have a gratuitous flavor
... ,[they] are often lacking in any 'natural formality."' State of N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n, supra note ,1, at 25, reprinted in 1953 Commission report, supra note 41,
at 557. That is, the actions themselves do not clearly indicate the nature of the
transaction. Id.; accord Gerard v. Steinbock, 169 Neb. 828, 830-33, 101 N.W.2d
194, 197-98 (1960); see 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.44, at 534; Fuller, supra note 1, at
804-06.
98. Gerard v. Steinbock, 169 Neb. 828, 830-33, 101 N.W.2d 194, 197-98 (1960);
In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 652, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 473 (Sur. Ct. 1941); G.
Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note 43, § 480, at 202-03; 9D P. Rohan, supra note 16,
13-2.1[1], at 13-117 to -118. The relationship between the parties, of course, does not
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ties to memorialize their agreement thus serves to distinguish legally
enforceable transactions from unenforceable expressions of gratitude
by clarifying the intentions of the parties. 99
2. Safeguards When Enforcing Agreements
The primary purpose of the Statute of Frauds' writing requirement
is, of course, the "prevention of frauds and perjuries."100 The logic
behind the Statute is quite simple: "Witnesses are subornable, but
forgery is a difficult art." ' 0' By requiring objective, written evidence
of a contract, the Statute of Frauds removes nearly all potential
avenues for fraudulent claims. 0 2 Moreover, the Statute protects both
courts and parties from lengthy and expensive trials by reducing the
amount of litigation premised solely on the often fault), memories of
parties and witnesses to an alleged oral agreement. 0 3
The protections afforded by the Statute of Frauds' evidentiary safe-
guards are especially important to lifetime and testamentary agree-
ments.104 "Such contracts are easily fabricated and hard to disprove,
because the sole contracting party on one side is [generally] dead
when the question arises. They are the natural resort of unscrupulous
preclude an expectation of payment or recompense. See B. Sparks, supra note 1, at
22-26; infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
99. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 41, at 23, reprinted in 1953
Commission Report, supra note 41, at 555; Fuller, supra note 1, at 805-06; see
Frankenberger v. Schneller, 258 N.Y. 270, 273, 179 N.E. 492, 493 (1932). The
writing requirement is similar to the delivery requirement relating to gifts; deliver'
of the gift is the formality that separates the legally enforceable gifts from gratuitous
expressions or intentions. Fuller, supra note 1, at 805-06. In either case, recover'
"cannot be based on disappointed expectations or even on expression of intention, in
the form of a promise which was not carried out." Frankenberger v. Schneller, 258
N.Y. at 273, 179 N.E. at 493.
100. An Act for Prevention of Frauds & Perjuries, 1677, 29 Car. 2, ch. 3 (repealed
2 & 3 Eliz. 2, ch. 34 (1954)); see A. Scott, supra note 1, § 40, at 96; L. Simpson, The
Law of Contracts 130 (2d ed. 1965); Costigan, Has There Been Judicial Legislation
in the Interpretation and Application of the "Upon Consideration of Marriage" and
Other Contract Clauses of the Statute of Frauds?, 14 111. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1919).
101. Perillo, supra note 83, at 68; see 1 A. Corbin, supra note 90, § 301, at 195
(Supp. 1980).
102. See L. Simpson, supra note 100, at 130; Costigan, supra note 100, at 5-6;
Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 170.
103. A. Corbin, supra note 12, § 275, at 381; 7B Warren's Heaton, supra note 13,
§ 100, 6, at 174 (Supp. 1981); 3 Brooklyn L. Rev. 150, 154 (1933); see Remele v.
Hamilton, 78 Ariz. 45, 50-51, 275 P.2d 403, 407 (1954); Dueser v. Meyer, 129 A.D.
598, 599, 114 N.Y.S. 64, 65 (1908).
104. 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.10, at 463-64; 3 Brooklyn L. Rev. 150, 153-54
(1933); see State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 40, at 12-13, 15,
reprinted in 1946 Commission Report, supra note 40, at 278-79, 281 (commenting on
the inadequacy of oral testimony in claims based on contracts to make a will).
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persons who wish to despoil the estates of decedents."' 05 A writing
requirement checks the flood of these "unfounded assertions,"'' 00 many
of which are pursued with the hope that the real beneficiaries will
settle to avoid delays in distribution of the estate. 07
Even when a plaintiff asserts a claim in good faith, the claim is
often "prompted by nothing more than a feeling that the decedent
ought to have made a certain property disposition and that he there-
fore must have contracted to that effect." 0 8 A sense of moral obliga-
tion or frequent declarations by the decedent of his intentions, how-
ever, does not give rise to a contractual obligation.10 By requiring
objective evidence of a contract, the Statute of Frauds prevents the
misinterpretation of general statements or expressions of gratitude as
words of promise.""
Moreover, testimony submitted in support of an oral lifetime or
testamentary contract is often unreliable due to the length of time
between making the alleged agreement and bringing suit for its non-
performance.' Any recollection of the circumstances, words of the
parties, or actual terms or promises, would be clouded by time. 1 2 A
court would be required to determine the existence of a contract based
solely on the ambiguous words and actions of the parties and unclear
105. Hamlin v. Stevens, 177 N.Y. 39, 47-48, 69 N.E. 118, 120-21 (1903); accord
Van Slooten v. Wheeler, 140 N.Y. 624, 633, 35 N.E. 583, 587 (1893); see Ohio
Statute of Frauds, supra note 9, at 166-67; Legal History, supra note 84, at 174.
106. 3 Brooklyn L. Rev. 150, 154 (1933); see authorities cited supra notes 103-04.
107. 3 Brooklyn L. Rev. 150, 154 (1933); 19 St. John's L. Rev. 152, 153 (1945); see
Trout v. Ogilvie, 41 Cal. App. 167, 172-73, 182 P. 333, 335 (1919); Rubin v. Irving
Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 298-99, 113 N.E.2d 424, 427 (1953); B. Sparks, supra note
1, at 48.
108. B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 22. Statements or expressions of future intent
without consideration and the concomitant assumption of a binding obligation carry
no contractual obligations. Frankenberger v. Schneller, 258 N.Y. 270, 273, 179 N.E.
492, 493 (1932); 3A Warren's Heaton, supra note 13, § 276, 2(j), at 48-158 to -159;
see 7B Warren's Heaton, supra note 13, § 100, 5; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 22-23.
109. Frankenberger v. Schneller, 258 N.Y. 270, 273, 179 N.E. 492, 493 (1932); In
re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 651, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 472 (Sur. Ct. 1941); B.
Sparks, supra note 1, at 22-23; see Cunningham v. Cunningham, 314 A.2d 834, 838
(Me. 1974).
110. In re Tschirky, 206 Misc. 868, 871, 135 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (Sur. Ct. 1954); In
re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 650, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468, 471 (Sur. Ct. 1941); State
of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 41, at 24, reprinted in 1953 Commission
Report, supra note 41, at 556; Ohio Statute of Frauds, supra note 9, at 167.
111. See Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 233-34, 135 N.E. 273, 275 (1922); 1
Page, supra note 2, § 10.10, at 464; 7B Warren's Heaton, supra note 13, § 100, 6, at
173-74 (Supp. 1981).
112. Remele v. Hamilton, 78 Ariz. 45, 50-51, 275 P.2d 403, 407 (1954); 7B
Warren's Heaton, supra note 13, § 100, 6, at 173-74 (Supp. 1981); see A. Corbin,
supra note 12, § 275, at 381.
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memories of witnesses." 3 The Statute of Frauds' lifetime and testa-
mentary provisions resolve this issue by delimiting the enforceable
contract from the unenforceable in an area where such demarcation
would otherwise be nebulous at best." 4
III. RELIEF FROM APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE
In a minority of jurisdictions, courts have held that noncompliance
with the writing requirement of the Statute of Frauds renders a
contract void and without any legal effect." s The majority of states,
however, provide that failure to produce written evidence of a con-
tract makes the contract voidable." 6 In these states, the contract
remains valid unless affirmatively avoided by one of the parties." 7
Because oral contracts that fall within the Statute of Frauds are
void or voidable, the promisor who refuses to perform is technically
doing no wrong; there is no breach of contract, merely the exercise of
a legal right under the Statute."" Allowing a promisor to escape his
113. A. Corbin, supra note 12, § 275, at 380-81; see Dueser v. Meyer, 129 A.D.
598, 599, 114 N.Y.S. 64, 65 (1908). See generally, Fuller, supra note 1, 800.06
(discussing need for formalities to fulfill evidentiarv and cautionary functions).
114. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 41, at 23-24, reprinted in
1953 Commission Report, supra note 41, at 554-55; A. Corbin, supra note 12, § 275,
at 380; Perillo, supra note 83, at 51; Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 170-71.
115. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-35, at 724. 'A promise that
creates no legal relation of any kind may properly be called a void promise.- A.
Corbin, supra note 12, § 7, at 12. A contract that is void is considered a nullity, and
relief based on the contract is not available. 3 S. Williston, The Law of Contracts §
531, at 759 (3d ed. 1960). A restitutionary remedy, however, remains available. D.
Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 13.2, at 948 (1973). Even where a
statute declares contracts within the Statute of Frauds void, however, "void" is often
interpreted as "voidable" or "unenforceable." A. Corbin, supra note 12, § 279, at
386-88; J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-35, at 724; D. Dobbs, supra, §
13.1, at 947.
116. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-35, at 724; see Fletcher v.
Williams, 153 So. 2d 759, 761 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Rubin v. Irving Trust Co.,
305 N.Y. 288, 307, 113 N.E.2d 424, 432 (1953) (Desmond, J., concurring); T... v.
T... , 216 Va. 867, 871-72, 224 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1976); A. Corbin, supra note 12,
§ 279, at 287.
117. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-35, at 724: see A. Corbin, supra
note 12, § 279, at 387. "Unenforceable contracts are those which have some legal
consequences but which may not be enforced in an action for damages or specific
performance in the face of certain defenses such as the Statute of Frauds . J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 1-11, at 18.
118. Rizika v. Kowalsky, 207 Misc. 254, 261, 138 N.Y.S.2d 711, 716 (Sup. Ct.
1954), aff'd, 285 A.D. 1009, 139 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1955); Owens v. Owens, 205 Misc.
506, 507, 132 N.Y.S.2d 215, 216 (App. Term 1954); Meltzer v. Koenigsberg, 99
N.Y.S.2d 143, 148 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 277 A.D. 1050, 100 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1950),
aff'd, 302 N.Y. 523, 99 N.E.2d 679 (1951); A. Corbin, supra note 12, §§ 280-300;
D. Dobbs, supra note 115, § 13.2, at 962; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 140.
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obligations by asserting the Statute as a defense, however, may lead to
harsh results that would appear to promote fraud. 19 In an effort to
avoid hardship and injustice, courts have developed exceptions to the
Statute of Frauds' writing requirement based on the doctrines of
restitution, part performance and estoppel.120
A. Restitution
Restitutionary remedies have long been employed in both law and
equity as a means of preventing defendants from being unjustly en-
riched under an unenforceable contract.'12  Courts have accom-
plished this result by allowing plaintiffs to pursue a remedy that is not
based on the contract but is premised on a fictional contract for the
benefits already rendered by the claimant. 122 The aim of restitution,
unlike damages for breach of contract, is the restoration of parties to
the positions they occupied before the transaction. 23 The recovery,
119. Knight v. Smith, 250 Ala. 113, 116, 33 So. 2d 242, 244-45 (1947) (Brown, J.,
dissenting); B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 45; see L. Simpson, supra note 100, § 79, at
157. "[T]he Statute of Frauds is intended to be a shield and not a sword, and . . . It
should not become an instrument by which fraud is perpetrated." Trollope v.
Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 16, 470 P.2d 91, 97 (1970); accord T . . . v. T .... 216 Va.
867, 871-72, 224 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1976).
120. Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 16, 18-19, 470 P.2d 91, 97, 99-100 (1970);
2 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 6.3, at 22. "It was never intended that the statute of
frauds could be used to permit one party . . . to use the statute to escape .. .
obligations." L. Simpson, supra note 100, § 78, at 156.
121. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 15-2, at 571; see Downey v. Union
Trust Co., 312 Mass. 405, 411, 45 N.E.2d 373, 377 (19,42). For a discussion of the
historical development of restitution, see I G. Palmer, supra note 48, §§ 1.1-.3
(1978); Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 Harv. L. Rev. 53 (1888); Perillo, Restitu-
tion in a Contractual Context, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 1208 (1973).
122. 1 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 1.1, at 2-3; e.g., Evans v. Mason, 82 Ariz. 40,
44-45, 308 P.2d 245, 248 (1957); Donovan v. Walsh, 238 Mass. 356, 362, 130 N.E.
841, 842 (1921); Weber v. Billman, 165 Ohio St. 431, 437-38, 135 N.E.2d 866, 871
(1956). The contract is not enforced; the courts imply a promise to pay for the goods
or services unjustly gained by the defendant. 3 S. Williston, supra note 115, § 534, at
817. "[O]ne universally recognized remedy [for non-compliance with the Statute of
Frauds] ... is recovery of the value of the services in quasi contract." 1 G. Palmer,
supra note 48, § 4.21, at 549-50 (footnote omitted). Generally, there is a requirement
that the plaintiff, in order to recover, must not be in default of the agreement. J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19.41, at 730. In a few jurisdictions, however,
a defaulting plaintiff may recover in restitution. 2 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 6.2, at
8-10.
123. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 15-1, at 570; Perillo, supra note
121, at 1220. The aim of restitution has not always been clearly defined. The
traditional theory is that the goal of restitution is to force the defendant to disgorge
any benefits unjustly received from the plaintiff. Id. Consequently, the award was
restricted to the amount of the enrichment, and if defendant did not gain, the
plaintiff recovered nothing. See id. at 1220-21. The other theory was to measure the
[Vol. 50
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
therefore, encompasses the reasonable value of the benefits already
conferred by the plaintiff, not the value the plaintiff might have
obtained had the contract been fully performed. 2 4
A question to be resolved before allowing a restitutionary recovery
is whether the claimant's services were performed gratuitously or in
expectation of payment. 25 In commercial settings, the presumption
is that services are performed or goods are delivered for remunera-
tion.126 A significant number of cases within the lifetime and testa-
mentary provisions, however, involve services rendered for a close
friend or relative pursuant to an informal agreement.'2 7 Because
fair market value of the plaintiff's services, even where the defendant actually
received no benefit from those services. The theory behind such a recovery is that it
would be "unconscionable for a person to bargain for the services of another and
escape paying the value of services rendered by repudiating the agreement." 2 C.
Palmer, supra note 48, § 6.3, at 19-20.
124. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19.45, at 733 (contrasting the
difference in the amount of recovery between the reasonable value of the services and
the amount recoverable in an action for damages for breach of contract). The
plaintiff does not recover the loss of profit, or expectation interest bargained for in
the contract. 2 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 6.1, at 2-3. Reliance interests may be
recoverable based on the theory that they are expenditures in carrying out perfor-
mance, as opposed to simply preparing to perform, and, therefore, confer a benefit
on the defendant in the same way that performance would. Id. § 6.3, at 20-23;
Perillo, supra note 121, at 1221-22. See generally Comment, The Necessity of Con-
ferring a Benefit for Recovery in Quasi-Contract, 19 Hastings L.J. 1259 (1968).
125. E.g., Evans v. Mason, 82 Ariz. 40, 44-45, 308 P.2d 245, 248 (1957); Downey
v. Union Trust Co., 312 Mass. 405, 411, 45 N.E.2d 373, 377 (1942); In re Adams, I
A.D.2d 259, 261, 149 N.Y.S.2d 849, 852 (1956), aff'd inm., 2 N.Y.2d 796, 140
N.E.2d 549, 159 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1957); In re Estate of O'Connor, 236 N.Y.S.2d 972,
973 (Sur. Ct. 1962); see Dombrowski v. Somers, 41 N.Y.2d 858, 859, 362 N.E.2d
257, 258, 393 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (1977). Restitution is denied also where the plaintiff
merely "volunteered" the services despite an expectation of remuneration. 1 G.
Palmer, supra note 48, § 1.7, at 43-44. Plaintiff cannot recover if he is a volunteer
and an "intermeddler" because "one should not intervene in the affairs of another
without the other's request, and.., such conduct will not be encouraged by award-
ing restitution." Id. § 1.7, at 43. The principle underlying the refusal to grant an
award in such situations is that the defendant was not unjustly enriched, nor did the
plaintiff unjustly lose. See id. § 1.7, at 43-44.
126. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 2-21, at 66; 3A Warren's Heaton,
supra note 13, § 276, 1, at 48-148 to -149. "The rule is that performance and
acceptance of services raises the inference of an implied contract to pay the reason-
able value thereof." In re Adams, 1 A.D.2d 259, 262, 149 N.Y.S.2d 849, 853 (1956),
aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d 796, 140 N.E.2d 549, 159 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1957); accord Morton
v. Yell, 239 Ark. 195, 197, 388 S.W.2d 88, 90 (1965); Doby v. Williams, 53 N.J.
Super. 548, 555, 148 A.2d 42, 46 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1959); Weber v. Billman, 165
Ohio St. 431, 438, 135 N.E.2d 866, 871 (1956).
127. See State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 13, at 31, reprinted in
1957 Commission Report, supra note 13, at 45; G. Bogert & G. Bogert, supra note
43, § 480, at 202-03; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 139; Sparks, Problems in the
Formation of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath, 40 Cornell L.Q. 60, 80 (1954);
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services performed in a close relationship are often bestowed out of
love and affection, courts presume that the parties did not intend a
contractual obligation. 128  Generally, courts require a claimant to
rebut this presumption by strong evidence of a contract.12
If it is established that the services were performed for compensa-
tion, the amount of recovery must then be calculated. 130  When the
plaintiff has given money to the defendant, or rendered services that
have an easily ascertainable market value, that value is the basis of the
recovery.'3' In many cases within the lifetime and testamentary
provisions, however, the services, such as companionship and affec-
tion, cannot be valued by reference to any market standard. 13 2  In
those instances the value set by the contract is the best determinant
and, recognizing this, most courts allow admission of the contract
price as evidence of the value of the services. 133
Schnebly, supra note 16, at 749-50; see, e.g., In re Adams, I A.D.2d 259, 261-62, 149
N.Y.S.2d 849, 852-53 (1956), aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d 796, 140 N.E.2d 549, 159
N.Y.S.2d 698 (1957); In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 651, 31 N.Y.S.2d 468,
472-73 (Sur. Ct. 1941).
128. E.g., Doby v. Williams, 53 N.J. Super. 548, 555, 148 A,2d 42, 46 (Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1959); In re Adams, 1 A.D.2d 259, 262, 149 N.Y.S.2d 849, 853 (1956),
aff'd mem., 2 N.Y.2d 796, 140 N.E.2d 549, 159 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1957); In re Estate of
O'Connor, 236 N.Y.S.2d 972, 973 (Sur. Ct. 1962); In re Tschirky, 206 Misc. 868,
871, 135 N.Y.S.2d 553, 556 (Sur. Ct. 1954); In re Estate of Mulderig, 196 Misc. 527,
531, 91 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (Sur. Ct. 1949); see 3A Warren's Heaton, supra note 13, §
276, 2, at 48-147 to -148, 48-151 to -152; 9D P. Rohan, supra note 16, § 13-2.1(4),
at 13-227 to -228.
129. See B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 23-25; see, e.g., Long v. Rumsey, 12 Cal. 2d
334, 343, 347, 84 P.2d 146, 150, 152 (1938); Weber v. Billman, 165 Ohio St. 431,
435, 135 N.E.2d 866, 869 (1956).
130. Evans v. Mason, 82 Ariz. 40, 44-45, 308 P.2d 245, 48 (1957); see 1 G.
Palmer, supra note 48, § 4.21, at 550; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 139; Perillo, supra
note 121, at 1216.
131. 2 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 6.3, at 25; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 140; see
Jeanblanc, Restitution Under the Statute of Frauds: Measurement of the Legal
Benefit Unjustly Maintained, 15 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 2-5 (1950); see, e.g., Evans v.
Mason, 82 Ariz. 40, 44-45, 308 P.2d 245, 248 (1957) (reasonable value of housekeep-
ing services ascertainable); Weber v. Billman, 165 Ohio St. 431, 436-37, 135 N.E.2d
866, 871 (1956) (same).
132. B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 141; 3 S. Williston, supra note 115, § 536, at 835;
see, e.g., Ledingham v. Bayless, 218 Md. 108, 114-15, 145 A.2d 434, 439 (1958);
Green v. Richmond, 369 Mass. 47, 49-50, 337 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1975); Snyder v.
Warde, 151 Ohio St. 426, 437, 86 N.E.2d 489, 493-94 (1949). But see Downey v.
Union Trust Co., 312 Mass. 405, 417-18, 45 N.E.2d 373, 380 (1942) (although
services, consisting of visiting testator and corresponding and writing with testator,
were "unusual" and "uncommon in ordinary experience," their value "was to be
determined by no other standard than that of fair market value").
133. 2 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 6.3, at 26; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 140-41;
e.g., Turner v. White, 329 Mass. 549, 555, 109 N.E.2d 155, 158, (1952); Hastoupis
v. Gargas, 398 N.E.2d 745, 751 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980); see Farrington v. Richard-
son, 153 Fla. 907, 915, 16 So. 2d 158, 162 (1944); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note
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Courts of equity have also developed restitutionary remedies that
allow a plaintiff to recover specific property from a defendant who
fails to perform a contract that violates the Statute of Frauds.'4 The
specific restitutionary remedy most commonly utilized is the construc-
tive trust. 1 35
Generally, the constructive trust decree involves a fictional transfer
of title whereby the defendant is deemed to hold legal title in trust for
the plaintiff.' 36 This fiction becomes unnecessary when a court or-
ders specific restitution of property still in the hands of the defend-
ant.' 37 Instead, the court simply orders cancellation of the deed or
redelivery of the property.' 38  If the defendant has sold or used the
property, however, the constructive trust doctrine allows the court to
treat the plaintiff as having an equitable right to any proceeds or
property generated thereby. 139
To obtain a constructive trust, the plaintiff must not only establish
the elements necessary for restitution at law, but must also demon-
strate that his legal remedies would be inadequate to prevent injus-
tice.1 40 The circumstances under which a court will grant a construc-
14, § 19-45, at 733. Where courts allow admission of the contract price as evidence of
the reasonable value of the services, and that amount is awarded as the value of the
plaintiff's services, it has been contended that, in effect, specific enforcement of the
contract has been granted. D. Dobbs, supra note 115, § 13.2, at 951; see J. Calamari
& J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-45, at 733.
134. Rizika v. Kowalsky, 207 Misc. 254, 260-61, 138 N.Y.S.2d 711, 716 (Sup. Ct.
1954), aJf'd mem., 285 A.D. 1009, 139 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1955); J. Calamari & J.
Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-46, at 734-35; 1 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 4.20, at 537;
2 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 6.12, at 91; 3 S. Williston, supra note 115, § 535, at
824, 826.
135. Equitable Trust Co. v. Hollingsworth, 29 Del. Ch. 563, 565, 49 A.2d 325,
327 (1946); 1 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 1.1, at 3, § 1.3, at 13; see J. Calamari & J.
Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-46, at 734; D. Dobbs, supra note 115, § 13.2, at 959.
136. See Dietz v. Dietz, 244 Minn. 330, 334, 70 N.W.2d 281, 286 (1955); Oursler
v. Armstrong, 10 N.Y.2d 385, 392, 179 N.E.2d 489, 492, 223 N.Y.S.2d 477, 481
(1961); Restatement of Restitution § 180 (1939); G. Bogert, supra note 2, § 77, at
288; 1 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 1.3, at 11-13. The fiction was created because of
the debate over whether equity could vest title in the plaintiff by the terms of an
equitable decree. 1 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 1.3, at 13-14.
137. See G. Bogert, supra note 2, § 83, at 301-03; 1 C. Palmer, supra note 48, §
1.3, at 13-14. When both parties are alive, it is possible to return them to the status
quo, which is the aim of restitution. If one party has died, however, and there has
been an agreement to devise or bequeath, it is impossible to put the parties back in
the status quo. In these cases, a constructive trust may be used as a means of
enforcing the agreement. A. Scott, supra note 1, § 55.1, at 128.
138. 1 G, Palmer, supra note 48, § 1.3, at 13-14.
139. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 1946, at 734; see 1 C. Palmer,
supra note 48, § 1.3, at 11-15; A. Scott, supra note 1, § 52.1, at 114-15.
140. G. Bogert, supra note 2, § 77, at 289; J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14,
§ 15-5, at 575; 5 A. Corbin, supra note 90, § 1120, at 63940; D. Dobbs, supra note
115, § 13.2, at 959; 1 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 1.3, at 15-16. But see Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 372 reporter's note (1981) (abandons adequacy test).
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tive trust, however, are not entirely clear.1 4' Typically, courts have
been reluctant to grant such a remedy in a commercial setting, even if
the property sought to be recovered is land. The promisee's willing-
ness to part with the property indicates that it is of no unique value to
him, and thus, a money recovery for the value of the land is deemed
adequate. 42
The remedy has been allowed, however, where the transaction
involves conveyance of real property in return for an oral promise of
lifetime support.' 43 In these cases, the agreement generally is not a
commercial transaction. Most often, the promisor is an elderly indi-
vidual who transfers the deed to his residence in exchange for an oral
promise of support from a relative or trusted companion.' 4 4 When
the promise of support is subsequently breached, the promisor will be
awarded specific restitution of the residence.' 45 Because the promisor
continues to live on the land with the companion, it is clear that the
property retains its unique value to the promisor and a money judg-
ment would be inadequate.' 4  The presence of a confidential or
fiduciary relationship, coupled with the inherently unique value of a
residence, appears to be the basis for the award.' 47
Restitutionary recovery, either at law or in equity, does not under-
cut the policies underlying the Statute of Frauds, because the remedy
141. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-46, at 734-35. Calamari and
Perillo state that a constructive trust generally is imposed where (1) there is a
fiduciary or confidential relationship; (2) the transaction involved fraud, duress,
undue influence or mistake; or (3) the conveyance was only for the purpose of
security. Id.; see D. Dobbs, supra note 115, § 13.2, at 959-60. See generally 1 G.
Palmer, supra note 48, § 1.3 (analyzing theories and applications of constructive
trust).
142. Restatement of Contracts § 354 comment b (1932); J. Calamari & J. Porillo,
supra note 14, § 15-5, at 575; 5 A. Corbin, supra note 90, § 1120, at 639-40; see
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 372 comment b (1981). 1 G. Palmer, supra note
48, § 4.20, at 538-39.
143. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 372 illustration 3 (1981); J. Calamari &
J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 15-5, at 575; 5 A. Corbin, supra note 90, § 1120, at 640; 1
G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 4.20, at 537; e.g., Teel v. Bank of Eureka, 42 Cal. App.
2d 807, 110 P.2d 78 (1941); Brown v. White, 410 Ill. 366, 102 N.E.2d 111 (1951);
Dietz v. Dietz, 244 Minn. 330, 70 N.W.2d 281 (1955).
144. 1 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 4.20, at 537-39. "Conveyances of property by
aged and infirm people in consideration of promised support and maintenance are
peculiar in their character and incidents, and with them the courts deal on principles
not applicable to ordinary conveyances." Russell v. Carver, 208 Ala. 219, 219, 94 So.
128, 128 (1922).
145. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-46, at 734-35; 1 G. Palmer,
supra note 48, § 4.20, at 541; A. Scott, supra note 1, § 44.2, at 104-05.
146. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 15-5, at 575; 1 G. Palmer,
supra note 48, § 4.20, at 537 & n.1, 538.
147. See supra note 141.
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does not enforce the contract.' 48  A recovery in restitution merely
requires proof that actual benefits were rendered in expectation of
payment, and proof of their value. 49  "Such services are generally
matters known to many persons and subject to adequate verification,
so that there is ample protection to the estate."'150 Restitution works
only to prevent the hardships and injustices that can result from rigid
application of the Statute of Frauds' lifetime and testamentary provi-
sions. '5'
B. Part Performance
The equitable doctrine of part performance originated as the first
court-created exception to the Statute of Frauds, and has long been
accepted by most jurisdictions as a means of enforcing oral contracts
for the sale of land.' 52  Perhaps because the doctrine has been estab-
lished for so long, the elements of part performance have become
somewhat settled.15 3 First, the conduct claimed to constitute part
performance must involve full or at least substantial performance of
the plaintiff's part of the alleged oral agreement.'1 Second, the
148. Downey v. Union Trust Co., 312 Mass. 405, 411, 45 N.E.2d 373, 377 (1942);
1 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 1.1, at 2-3; D. Dobbs, supra note 115, § 4.2, at 237; see
State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 13, at 38, reprinted in 1957
Commission Report, supra note 13, at 52; A. Scott, supra note 1, § 44.2, at 104-05.
149. See In re Adams, 1 A.D.2d 259, 262, 149 N.Y.S.2d 849, 853 (1956), aff'd
mem., 2 N.Y.2d 796, 140 N.E.2d 549, 159 N.Y.S.2d 698 (1957); 2 G. Palmer, supra
note 48, § 6.12, at 92; supra notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
150. In re Estate of McGrath, 71 N.Y.S.2d 853, 856 (Sur. Ct. 1947), quoted in
State of N.Y. Lav Revision Comm'n, supra note 13, at 38, reprinted in 1957
Commission Report, supra note 13, at 52.
151. 2 G. Palmer, supra note 48, § 6.7, at 63; see J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra
note 14, § 15-2, at 571.
152. Snyder v. Warde, 151 Ohio St. 426, 432-33, 86 N.E.2d 489, 492 (1949); A.
Corbin, supra note 12, § 422, at 435; 1 Page, supra note 2, § 10.13, at 46S: 3 S.
Williston, supra note 115, § 494, at 560; Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at
171-72; see L. Simpson, supra note 100, at 157. Three states refuse to allow the
doctrine of part performance to take a contract for the transfer of real property out of
the Statute of Frauds: Mississippi, North Carolina, and Tennessee. See J. Calamari &
J. Perillo, supra note 14, at 697 n.78. See generally Gilbride, The Part Performance
Exception in New York, 26 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1 (1959) (analy-zing doctrine as applied
to oral land contracts); Comment, Oral Land Contracts and the Doctrine of Part
Performance in Idaho, 8 Idaho L. Rev. 205 (1971) (same).
153. Busque v. Marcou, 147 Me. 289, 293-95, 86 A.2d 873, 876 (1952); Equitable
Estoppel, supra note 11, at 172.
154. See T... v. T. . . , 216 Va. 867, 871, 872-73, 224 S.E.2d 148, 151, 152
(1976); D. Dobbs, supra note 115, § 13.2, at 961; L. Simpson, supra note 100, § 79,
at 157-58. The doctrine of part performance, however, has been applied in the
context of oral land sale contracts where the promisee performs acts in reliance on the
oral agreement, rather than pursuant to its terms and conditions. 2 A. Corbin, supra
note 90, § 426; Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 173 n. 19. The part performance
asserted must be performance "on the part of one seeking to charge the other party
under the contract, not part performance on the part of the one whom it is sought to
charge." Busque v. Marcou, 147 Me. 289, 295-97, 86 A.2d 873, 877 (1952).
19811
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
conduct must be "unequivocally referable" to the agreement; the
actions must be explainable only by the existence of a contract. 55
Third, the agreement must be proven by clear and convincing evi-
dence, 156 and the terms of the agreement must be shown to be definite
and unambiguous. 15 7 Finally, because part performance is an equita-
ble doctrine, plaintiff must demonstrate that a restitutionary remedy
at law would be inadequate.' 58
The doctrine of part performance has been applied infrequently to
contracts within the lifetime and testamentary provisions, primarily
because the acts claimed as part performance in these situations are
rarely "unequivocally referable" to the existence of a contract. 59  In
most cases, the close personal relationship between the parties offers a
non-contractual explanation for the conduct of the claimant, thereby
defeating any claim of part performance.
Some jurisdictions do not recognize the doctrine of part perfor-
mance as a means of enforcing any contract that falls within the
lifetime or testamentary provisions. 160 Courts in these jurisdictions
have reasoned that, in the absence of effective rebuttal by the promi-
sor or written evidence of the alleged agreement, the potential for
155. Kimmel v. Roberts, 179 Neb. 8, 12, 136 N.W.2d 208, 210-11 (1965); T...
v. T .... 216 Va. 867, 872-73, 224 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1976). "The acts ... [must]
directly point to that contract as the only reasonable explanation for their perfor-
mance." L. Simpson, supra note 100, § 79 at 159. "What is done must itself supply
the key to what is promised. It is not enough that what is promised may give
significance to what is done." Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 232, 135 N.E.
273, 273 (1922).
156. E.g., Shannon v. Waterhouse, 58 Hawaii 4, 7, 563 P.2d 391, 394 (1977),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); Kimmel v. Roberts, 179 Neb. 8, 12, 136 N.W.2d
208, 210 (1965); Payn v. Hoge, 21 Wash. 2d 32, 39, 149 P.2d 939, 942 (1944); see
Dreher v. Levy, 67 A.D.2d 438, 441, 415 N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (1976).
157. T... v. T. . . ,216 Va. 867, 871-72, 224 S.E.2d 148, 151 (1976).
158. Evans v. Mason, 82 Ariz. 40, 44-45, 308 P.2d 245, 248 (1957); L. Simpson,
supra note 100, § 79, at 158-59; see Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 16, 470 P.2d
91, 98 (1970); T ... v. T .... 216 Va. 867, 871-73, 224 S.E.2d 148, 151-52 (1976).
Although the doctrine of part performance originated solely in equity, recent author-
ities indicate that part performance may be used to award damages at law. Miller v,
McCamish, 78 Wash. 2d 821, 479 P.2d 919 (1971), reviewed by 47 Wash. L. Rev.
524 (1972); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, at 696 n.73.
159. A. Corbin, supra note 12, § 435, at 442. "[T]he rendition of such services are
explainable on a number of different grounds, such as love and affection, a supposed
moral duty, hope of a legacy or other financial award." L. Simpson, supra note 100,
§ 79, at 159; e.g., Kimmel v. Roberts, 179 Neb. 8, 11-12, 136 N.W.2d 208, 210
(1965); Bayreuther v. Reinisch, 264 A.D. 138, 141, 34 N.Y.S.2d 674, 677 (1942),
aff'd mem., 290 N.Y. 553, 47 N.E.2d 959 (1943).
160. E.g., First Gulf Beach Bank & Trust Co. v. Grubaugh, 330 So. 2d 205, 210
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); In re Estate of Douglas, 169 Misc. 716, 717, 8 N.Y.S.2d
717, 718 (Sur. Ct. 1938), aft'd, 256 A.D. 1070, 12 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1939); Snyder v.
Warde, 151 Ohio St. 426, 443, 86 N.E.2d 489, 497 (1949).
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fraud and perjury is simply too great. 61 Clearly, any other result
would effectively nullify the testamentary and lifetime provisions. 'z
When the claim is not against a decedent's estate, however, the
chances of perjured proof are materially reduced because the promi-
sor is available to rebut the claims. 16 3 Examples of such situations are
instances of repudiation, or lifetime contracts when the lifetime is not
that of the promisor. In such cases, the strict requirements of the part
performance doctrine coupled with the availability of both parties
provide an adequate evidentiary substitute for the Statute's writing
requirement. 16 4 Although the cautionary function of the Statute is
undercut, enforcement may be justified on "the grounds that part
161. E.g., Knight v. Smith, 250 Ala. 113, 114-15, 33 So. 2d 242, 24344 (1947);
First Gulf Beach Bank & Trust Co. v. Grubaugh, 330 So. 2d 205, 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1976); In re Estate of Ditson, 177 Misc. 648, 653-54, 31 N.Y.S.2d 46S, 474-75
(Sur. Ct. 1949); see Burns v. McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 033, 135 N.E. 273, 274
(1922). One argument is that in almost every claim of an oral contract against a
decedent's estate the basis of the charge is that the plaintiff has performed one side of
the contract. If part performance were grounds for relief from the Statute, then every
case meant to be covered would fall within the exception. State of N.Y. Law Revision
Comm'n, supra note 13, at 34, reprinted in 1957 Commission Report, supra note 13,
at 48. The Statute would be obviated, leaving its purposes unfulfilled. Id. Of course,
rigid interpretation of the Statute does lead to some harsh results. See Knight v.
Smith, 250 Ala. at 115, 33 So. 2d at 244 (Brown, J., dissenting). In one case,
however, it was argued that the Statute of Frauds should be even more stringent: The
party seeking relief under an unenforceable oral contract with a decedent should be
forced to return any consideration claimed to have been given by the decedent. In re
Estate of Douglas, 170 Misc. 155, 156, 9 N.Y.S.2d 631, 632 (Sur. Ct. 1938), af'd
mem., 256 A.D.2d 1070, 12 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1939). Although the court did not require
return of the consideration, it did indicate that complete enforcement of the Statute
would require return of any consideration allegedly received from a promisor, be-
cause a promisee to a lifetime or testamentary contract is usually in a position to seize
property of the deceased and claim it was delivery on account. Id. at 157, 9 N.Y.S.2d
at 633.
162. First Gulf Beach Bank & Trust Co. v. Grubaugh, 330 So. 2d 205, 210 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Donner v. Donner, 302 So. 2d 452, 460 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1974) (Carroll, J., dissenting); In re Estate of Keeler, 186 Misc. 20, 24, 53 N.Y.S.2d
61, 66 (Sur. Ct. 1945); see Sherman v. Johnson, 159 Ohio St. 209, 222-23, 112
N.E.2d 326, 333-34 (1953).
163. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 41, at 27, reprinted in 1953
Commission Report, supra note 41, at 559; see State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n,
supra note 13, at 34-35, reprinted in 1957 Commission Report, supra note 13, at
48-49; B. Sparks, supra note 1, at 25-26.
164. State of N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n, supra note 13, at 4749, reprinted in
1957 Commission Report, supra note 13, at 33-34; Equitable Estoppel, supra note
11, at 172-73. One explanation for the doctrine is that the acts constituting perfor-
mance, if unequivocally referable to the contract, provide sufficient evidence of the
contract to substitute for the necessity of a writing. H. McLintock, McLintock on
Equity 140 (2d ed. 1948). This evidentiary protection can only be ensured, however,
if courts do not liberally construe actions as "unequivocally referable" to the con-
tract. See Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 181-82.
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performance in reliance upon the promise may result in a virtual
fraud if the promise is not specifically enforced."' 0 5 To effectuate the
policies of the lifetime and testamentary provisions, however, the
doctrine should be allowed only in those extreme cases where the
balance of interests clearly favors the plaintiff.
C. Estoppel
Historically, the doctrine of estoppel precluded a party from deny-
ing the truth of his own representations. From this original concept,
two different types of estoppel have evolved: equitable estoppel and
promissory estoppel.166 Equitable estoppel bars an individual from
asserting rights based on a denial of the truth of his own representa-
tions of past or present facts upon which another justifiably relied to
his detriment. 6 7  For example, if a party represents that a written
memorandum of an agreement exists, when in fact it does not, and in
reliance on that representation the promisee fails to insist upon a
writing, the promisor will be estopped from asserting that the agree-
ment is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. 0 8
Promissory estoppel, on the other hand, estops a promisor from
asserting a legal right premised on the denial of a promise as to future
conduct upon which a promisee justifiably and detrimentally re-
lied. '9 As used to defeat a Statute of Frauds' defense, promissory
165. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-15, at 697 n.77; accord Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts § 197 (1981). The rationale advanced to Justify the
doctrine of part performance is that "to allow the defendant to rely on the statute,
after plaintiff has acted on the faith of the oral contract so that he would be
irreparably injured, would be to permit the statute to be made an instrument of
fraud." H. McLintock, supra note 164, § 58, at 141. The emphasis on detrimental
reliance brings the doctrine very close to the doctrine of equitable estoppel. Equitable
Estoppel, supra note 11, at 173; see infra pt. III(C).
166. Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 224-28, 211 P.2d 806, 812-15 (1949), J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, §§ 11-33, 19-48 to -49; Promissory Estoppel,
supra note 11, at 115-16; Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 179.
167. Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co., 349 F.2d 328, 333 (6th Cir. 1965) (applying
Michigan law); Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 19, 470 P.2d 91, 100 (1970) (en
bane); Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 226-27, 211 P.2d 806, 814 (1949); T . . . v.
T .... 216 Va. 867, 872-73, 224 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1976); J. Calamari & J. Perillo,
supra note 14, § 11-34, at 445; 1 S. Williston, supra note 115, § 139. But see
Goldberg v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 284 A.D. 678, 681, 134 N.Y.S.2d 865, 869-70
(1954) ("Estoppel cannot be invoked where each of the parties had equal means of
knowledge of the unenforceability of the contract.").
168. 21 Turtle Creek Square, Ltd. v. New York State Teachers' Retirement Sys.,
432 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1970) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971);
Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 16, 470 P.2d 91, 98-99 (1970); J. Calamarl & J.
Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-47, at 736.
169. Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 223-24, 211 P.2d 806, 812-13 (1949); J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 6-1, at 202 & n.2, 203. In the past, promissory
estoppel has been used as a substitute for consideration. Id. § 11-34, at 445; Prom is-
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estoppel was originally applied only when a promisor made a subsidi-
ary promise to reduce the agreement to writing.170 If the promisee
detrimentally relied on the subsidiary promise, the promisor would be
estopped from asserting a Statute of Frauds' defense and the underly-
ing agreement would be enforced. 17
Virtually all jurisdictions allow the doctrine of equitable estoppel to
bar a Statute of Frauds' defense.172  The justification is that the
Statute was enacted to prevent fraud, and courts will not allow a
defendant to use the Statute to promote fraud. 73 Without equitable
estoppel, virtual fraud could result if a defendant, by his own con-
duct, could misrepresent past or present facts, and thus gain from
inducing another to detrimentally rely upon that misrepresentation. 174
Courts have been more reluctant to apply promissory estoppel to
defeat the Statute of Frauds, despite the fiction that the Statute's
policies are not undercut, because it is the subsidiary promise, not the
original unenforceable promise, that the defendant is estopped from
denying. 17
5
sory Estoppel supra note 11, at 122. The Second Restatement of Contracts states,
however, that the doctrine of promissory estoppel should not be used as a means of
displacing the Statute of Frauds writing requirement as readily as it is used to
substitute for consideration. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139 comment b,
illustration 2 (1981).
170. Restatement of Contracts § 178 comment f (1932); Promissory Estoppel,
supra note 11, at 117; see Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 16, 470 P.2d 91, 99
(1970) (en bane).
171. Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 225-28, 211 P.2d 806, 813-15 (1949): 3 S.
Williston, supra note 115, § 533A, at 786; Promissory Estoppel, supra note 11, at
117; see Johnson v. Gilbert, 127 Ariz. 410, 414, 621 P.2d 916, 920 (1980); Restate-
ment of Contracts § 178 comment f (1932).
172. Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 226-27, 211 P.2d 806, 814 (1949): J.
Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 19-47, at 735-36; 3 S. Williston, supra note
115, § 533A, at 797; see Note, The Statute of Frauds and Estoppel: Creating Uncer-
tainty in Iowa Contract Law, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 639, 641 (1981).
173. Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 220-21, 211 P.2d 806, 810 (1949); Monarco
v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d, 621, 624-25, 220 P.2d 737, 740 (1950) (en bane); Promissory
Estoppel, supra note 11, at 118; see Oxley v. Ralston Purina Co., 349 F.2d 328, 332
(6th Cir. 1965) (applying Michigan law).
174. See T ... v. T. . . , 216 Va. 867, 872-73, 224 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1976); D.
Dobbs, supra note 115, § 13.2, at 963; 3 S. Williston, supra note 115, § 533A, at
796-97, 802-03; authorities cited supra note 173.
175. Note, Promissory Estoppel and The Statute of Frauds in California, 66 Cal.
L. Rev. 1219, 1229 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Statute of Frauds in California];
Promissory Estoppel, supra note 11, at 116-17. A large loophole was created because
promissory estoppel allowed enforcement of the principal oral promise that was
barred by the Statute of Frauds, by proving a subsidiary oral promise. Id.; see, e.g.,
Alaska Airlines v. Stephenson, 217 F.2d 295, 298 (9th Cir. 1954) (applying Alaska
law); Aubrey v. Workman, 384 S.W. 2d 389, 393-94 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). Where
the Statute bars enforcement of a promise because it is oral, the addition of a second
oral promise should not be sufficient to take the original out of the Statute. See
Promissory Estoppel, supra note 11, at 117; cf. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Holden,
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The modern tendency in an increasing number of jurisdictions has
been to broaden the application of promissory estoppel.170  Under this
approach, the plaintiff need only show an "unconscionable injury,"
coupled with detrimental reliance upon a promise proven by clear
and convincing evidence. 1'7 Application of this more liberal doc-
trine, however, frustrates the policies of the Statute of Frauds. 178 The
"unconscionable injury" standard is too indefinite. It is defined only
by a nebulous concept of fairness and, therefore, is subject to a liberal
interpretation. 7 Courts could easily lose sight of the policies and
safeguards of the Statute of Frauds by focusing solely on their own
166 F. Supp. 684, 691 (S. D. Cal. 1958) (applying California law) ("[W]e know of no
principle of estoppel which would change an oral contract into a written one, even if
equitable considerations should call for the enforcement of such contracts.").
176. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 11-34, at 445-46, § 19-48, at 736:
D. Dobbs, supra note 115, § 13-2, at 964; Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 173,
179; see 3 S. Williston, supra note 115, § 533A, at 801; see e.g., Oxley v. Ralston
Purina Co., 349 F.2d 328, 335-36 (6th Cir. 1965) (applying Michigan law); Brewood
v. Cook, 207 F.2d 439, 441-42 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (applying District of Columbia law);
Waugh v. Lennard, 69 Ariz. 214, 226-28, 211 P.2d 806, 814-15 (1949); Rcdke v.
Silvertrust, 6 Cal. 3d 94, 103-04, 490 P.2d 805, 810-11, 98 Cal. Rptr. 293, 299 (1971)
(en bane), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1041 (1972); Boesiger v. Freer, 85 Idaho 551,
561-64, 381 P.2d 802, 808-09 (1963).
177. Monarco v. Lo Greco, 35 Cal. 2d 621, 623-24, 626, 220 P.2d 737, 739-40
(1950) (en bane). In Monarco, the California court held that estoppel would be
granted in instances where "unconscionable injury" or "unjust enrichment" would
result. Id. at 625, 220 P.2d at 740. Those elements are present when either one party
would suffer unconscionable injury or the other party would be unjustly enriched if
the contract were not enforced. In re Estate of Baglione, 65 Cal. 2d 192, 197-98, 417
P.2d 683, 687-88, 53 Cal. Rptr. 139, 143-44 (1966) (en bane); Day v. Greene, 59 Cal.
2d 404, 410, 380 P.2d 385, 388-89, 29 Cal. Rptr. 785, 788-89 (1963) (en bane). The
majority of jurisdictions employing the modern formulation of estoppel use only the
"unconscionable injury" standard as the threshold criteria, and the "unjust enrich-
ment" standard has apparently been relegated to its traditional role in restitution.
Promissory Estoppel, supra note 11, at 119-20; see D. Dobbs, supra note 115, § 13.2,
at 963-65.
178. Promisory estoppel does not address the evidentiary and cautionary functions
of the Statute of Frauds. The doctrine focuses rather on the plaintiff's losses or
possible hardships, in effect, circumventing the purposes of the Statute of Frauds.
Trollope v. Koerner, 106 Ariz. 10, 18, 470 P.2d 91, 99 (1970) (en bane); see Tanen-
baum v. Biscayne Osteopathic Hosp., 173 So. 2d 492, 495 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965);
Promissory Estoppel, supra note 11, at 119; Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at
179-80.
179. See Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 176-77; cf. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 139 comment b (1981) (avoidance of injustice is a very flexible standard).
A clear example is found in Goldstein v. McNeil, 122 Cal. App. 2d 608, 612, 265 P.2d
113, 115 (1954). Plaintiff shipped a load of used cars pursuant to an oral contract
which defendant repudiated. The court found that refusal to enforce the contract
would result in an "unconscionable injury" because plaintiff "missed the very high
market existing around the time of the contract and was caught in a sharp slump."
Id. at 612, 265 P.2d at 115.
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moral sense of "doing justice." 80 In fact, courts employing a broad
promissory estoppel theory "clearly have done so with the intention of
restricting the Statute's operation [solely] to those cases in which its
application would not produce an 'unfair' result." '8'
Certainly a statute enacted to prevent fraud should not be allowed
to promulgate fraud. 8 2 In instances where a party has perpetrated
actual fraud, or induced detrimental reliance through factual misrep-
resentation, estoppel is arguably justified.18 3 It should be recognized,
however, that although equitable estoppel protects against fraudulent
use of the Statute, it does not provide adequate evidentiary safeguards
against fraudulent allegations of a contract. 8 4 This is especially true
when the claim is against a decedent's estate, and thus based on oral
proof that is highly susceptible to perjury. Due to the heightened
potential for fraud, courts should be extremely reluctant to apply the
estoppel doctrine in cases that are within the lifetime and testamen-
tary provisions. If the doctrine is utilized, perhaps courts should re-
quire the additional evidentiary protections afforded by the doctrine
of part performance, such as proof of performance that is "unequivo-
cally referable" to the contract. 5
Furthermore, courts should carefully balance the important public
safeguards of the Statute against the alleged fraud that might be
perpetrated by applying the Statute of Frauds. 86 "If the only 'fraud'
is that the defendant is relying on the statute, that is no fraud at all,
but the exercise of a legal right given by the Statute."' 8 7  When
180. Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 175; see Promissory Estoppel, supra
note 11, at 128; Bouret, Oral Will Contracts and the Statute of Frauds in California
1896-1980: A Summary and Evaluation, 8 Pepperdine L. Rev. 41, 68 (1980).
181. Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 175.
182. See supra notes 119, 173 and accompanying text.
183. Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 180-81; see T ... v. T .... 216 Va.
867, 872-73, 224 S.E.2d 148, 152 (1976).
184. Statute of Frauds in California, supra note 175, at 1220-21; see Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 139 comment c & reporter's note (1981); Equitable Estoppel,
supra note 11, at 181-82.
185. See Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 181-82.
186. See Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 300, 113 N.E.2d 424, 428
(1953) ("It is clear that the enforcement of such oral contracts . . . is completely
inconsistent with and imperils the policy of this State .... "); Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 139 comment b & reporter's note, comment c (1981) (courts should
determine whether detrimental reliance of promisee outweighs policy and purpose
behind the applicable Statute of Frauds' provision); Equitable Estoppel, supra note
11, at 179-80 (same).
187. D. Dobbs, supra note 115, § 13.2, at 962; accord Rizika v. Kowalsky, 207
Misc. 254, 260, 138 N.Y.S.2d 711, 716 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mere., 285 A.D. 1009,
139 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1955); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 14, § 1940, at 729; 3 S.
Williston, supra note 115, § 536, at 828; see In re Estate of Keeler, 186 Misc. 20, 24,
53 N.Y.S.2d 61, 66 (Sur. Ct. 1945).
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legislatures enacted the Statute of Frauds' provisions, it was obvious
that there might be "harsh results," but the policy protections af-
forded by the Statute were believed to outweigh the equitable consid-
erations. 88 Moreover, enforcement of the Statute of Frauds does not
leave a plaintiff without a remedy; he may recover his losses through
restitution, 8 9 or assert that the contract is enforceable under the
doctrine of part performance. 90
CONCLUSION
Protecting estates from fraudulent claims and enforcing valid con-
tracts are both commendable goals. These goals collide, however,
when an oral contract to make a testamentary disposition is asserted
in derogation of a decedent's will. The clash between the decedent's
intentions and a claimant's rights can be prevented by demanding
that all contracts requiring performance after death be evidenced by a
writing. The disposition of a decedent's property, left to the care and
protection of the probate system, should not be disturbed by allega-
tions of contrary oral intention. In addition, the judiciary should not
be forced to entertain spurious or fraudulent litigation by self-serving
claimants.
A writing requirement for lifetime and testamentary contracts can
lead to harsh results. Courts can ease the impact of the statutory
requirements, however, through application of the doctrines of resti-
tution, part performance and estoppel. Nevertheless, these doctrines
should be applied sparingly. Courts should not yield to the temptation
to expand these exceptions to the point of defeating the important
purposes of the Statute of Frauds.
Karen I. Walsh
188. Bouret, supra note 180, at 68; see Snyder v. Warde, 151 Ohio St. 426, 445, 86
N.E.2d 489, 497-98 (1949). Although the plaintiff does not gain from the agreement,
this is "a result which is invited and risked when the agreement is not reduced to
writing in the manner prescribed by law." Ozier v. Haines, 411 II1. 160, 164-65, 103
N.E.2d 485, 488 (1952); accord Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 180; see Rubin
v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N.Y. 288, 302, 113 N.E.2d '124, 429 (1953); A. Scott, supra
note 1, § 40, at 97, § 55.9, at 133.
189. Snyder v. Warde, 151 Ohio St. 426, 445, 86 N.E.2d 489, 497-98 (1949);
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 139(2)(a) comment c & illustration 4 (1981); see
supra pt. III (A).
190. Equitable Estoppel, supra note 11, at 181-82; supra pt. III (B).
